In the Matter of Eric Passmore

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter
of the Care and Treatment of Eric Passmore, Appellant.

Appeal from Greenville County

 Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-037

Submitted January 2, 2009 – Filed January
15, 2009

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, Assistant
Attorney General R. Westmoreland Clarkson, and Assistant Attorney General
William Blitch, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Eric Passmore appeals his commitment to the South
Carolina Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator. Passmore argues the trial court erred in allowing the
State’s witness to testify to the factual allegations of Passmore’s criminal
sexual conduct with a minor charge when Passmore pled guilty to the
lesser-included offense of committing a lewd act on a minor.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities:  State v.
Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 577, 647
S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007) (“The admission of evidence is within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either
lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law.”); State v. Robinson, 305 S.C. 469, 474, 409 S.E.2d 404,
408 (1991) (stating a party cannot complain of prejudice from evidence to which
he opened the door); State v.
Stroman, 281 S.C. 508, 513, 316 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1984) (holding when a
party introduces evidence of a particular matter, the other party is entitled
to introduce evidence to explain or rebut it, even though the latter evidence
would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially); State
v. Culbreath, 377 S.C. 326, 333, 659 S.E.2d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[A]
defendant may open the door to what
would be otherwise improper evidence through his own introduction of evidence
or witness examination.”);  Floyd v. Floyd, 365 S.C. 56, 92, 615 S.E.2d
465, 484 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the door-opening doctrine applies not
only in a criminal law context, but in a civil context as well). 

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.