State v. Davis

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Paul Ray Davis, Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-664

Submitted December 1, 2008 – Filed
December 8, 2008   

AFFIRMED

Christopher D. Brough, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Michelle Parsons, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: Paul
Ray Davis pled guilty to two counts of unlawful neglect of a child; one count
of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, third offense; one
count of distribution of methamphetamine, third offense; one count of
possession of methamphetamine, third offense; one count of trafficking in
methamphetamine greater than 28 grams, third offense; and one count of unlawful
possession of a weapon.  Davis was sentenced to a total of eighteen years’
imprisonment.  He now appeals his sentence, arguing the circuit court erred in
sentencing him to eighteen years’ imprisonment because he provided information
to law enforcement as agreed in his plea deal. 

We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  State v.
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) (holding in criminal
cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only); State v.
Gates, 299 S.C. 92, 95, 382 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1989) (holding when the
language of a plea agreement “is perfectly plain and capable of legal
construction, such language determines the force and effect” of the agreement); State v. Armstrong, 263 S.C. 594, 597, 211 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1975) (“[I]t
is the prerogative of any person to waive his rights, confess, and plead
guilty, under judicially defined safeguards, which are adequately enforced.”); State
v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 677, 678, 623 S.E.2d 661, 664, 665 (Ct. App.
2005) (requiring courts to refrain from “read[ing] terms or conditions into the
contract that the parties did not intend” and to “enforce an unambiguous
contract according to its terms, regardless of the contract’s wisdom or folly,
or the parties’ failure to guard their rights carefully”); Reed v. Becka,
333 S.C. 676, 685, 688, 511 S.E.2d 396, 401, 402 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding a
plea agreement is subject to contract principles and generally, whether written
or oral, a plea agreement becomes binding when a court accepts the defendant’s
guilty plea). 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., SHORT and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.