Johnson v. Jackson

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Helen P.
Johnson, Respondent,

v.

Mamie Jackson, Appellant.

Appeal from Richland County

 Joseph M. Strickland, Master-In-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No.  2008-UP-502

Submitted September 2, 2008 – Filed
September 5, 2008

AFFIRMED

Mamie Jackson, of Columbia, pro se, for Appellant.

Leo Dryer, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
Helen Johnson brought suit
against Mamie Jackson for Jackson’s breach of a land purchase agreement.   The
circuit court found Jackson in default, and referred the matter to the
master-in-equity.  Jackson now contends the master did not have jurisdiction
because the order of reference was based on an erroneous grant of default.  We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authority: Winesett v. Winesett, 287 S.C. 332, 334, 338 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1985) (“[A] default judgment
may not be appealed to [the supreme court].  The proper procedure for
challenging a default judgment is to move the trial court to set aside the
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP.”); Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330
S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon
by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.”).

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN, C.J., and HUFF, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.