Slezak v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING   EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Gary Slezak, Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appeal From Dorchester County

 Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-005

Submitted December 1, 2007 – Filed January
2, 2008      

AFFIRMED

Gary Slezak, pro se, of Ridgeville, for Appellant.

Deputy General Counsel Barton J. Vincent, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Gary Slezak, a prisoner
serving a life sentence at the South Carolina Department of Corrections for two
murders and an armed robbery, appeals the order of the circuit court that
dismisses his appeal from a decision of Administrative Law Judge Division.  We
affirm. [1]

On
May 15, 2000, Slezak filed an inmate grievance with the South Carolina
Department of Corrections.  It read as follows:

Request
that my work credits be corrected to reflect that I be given credit for my
entire sentence of the court on January 18, 1982.  I have not be[en] given work
credits and my parole eligibility date is incorrect.  See S.C. Code §
24-21-635 (1981) & State v. Varner, 310 S.C. 264, 265, 423 S.E.2d
133, 134 (1992); Al-Shabazz v. State, Op. No. 24995 (S.C. Sup. Ct. refilled Feb. 14, 2000) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 6 at 21). 

Where
the form asked Slezak to describe the action he wanted taken, he responded, “Grant
work credits for entire sentence since court sentenced me until present [and]
notify parole board of correction.” 

The
Department denied Slezak’s grievance after review.  Its decision gave January
26, 1981, as his commitment date, found him not entitled to receive earned work
credits because of his life sentence, and listed July 21, 2000, as his parole
eligibility date.  Slezak appealed, contending “the controlling date for work
credits is . . . the date I was sentenced.”  The Department once again denied Slezak’s
grievance on the ground his life sentence precluded him from earning work
credits.

The
Administrative Law Judge Division thereafter affirmed the Department’s decision
and Slezak appealed to the circuit court, contending his initial parole
eligibility date was later than it should have been had he received earned work
credits.  That court affirmed the order of the Administrative Law Judge
Division, finding, among other things, the issue raised by Slezak in his appeal
regarding his not being given earned work credits to be moot “[e]ven if [Slezak]
was entitled to the work credits.” 

We
agree with the circuit court. 

The
record shows July 21, 2000, Slezak’s initial parole date as determined by the
Department, has long since come and gone.  Moreover, he was denied parole on
that date and, apparently, since that time; consequently, the question of
whether he should have received a parole hearing at an earlier date because of
earned work credits to which he may have been entitled is of no moment.  He proved
not to be a candidate for parole in any case.  For us to decide the question of
whether the Department wrongfully denied Slezak earned work credits would
accomplish nothing and would constitute merely an advisory opinion on our part. 
We do not issue advisory opinions.  Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 420, 505
S.E.2d 344, 354 (Ct. App. 1998).

Slezak
also appeals the circuit court’s holding that the Court of General Sessions
lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time he entered his guilty plea. 
This issue is manifestly without merit.  State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610
S.E.2d 494 (2005); see Rule 220(2), SCACR (“The Court of Appeals need
not address a point which is manifestly without merit”).

Finally,
Slezak appeals the failure of the circuit court to convert his grievance
petition into a post-conviction application.  This issue was neither raised to
nor ruled upon by the circuit court and may not now be heard.  See Wilder
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 333 (1998) (an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and
ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review).  

AFFIRMED.

Huff
and Pieper, JJ. and Goolsby, A.J. concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.