State v. Harrison

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jack Harrison, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-168007

Appeal From Saluda County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-348
Heard May 8, 2012 – Filed June 6, 2012

AFFIRMED

Jack B. Swerling of Columbia, Katherine Carruth Goode
of Winnsboro for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia,
and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jack Harrison, Jr., was indicted for misrepresenting identity to a
law enforcement officer, possession of marijuana, and possession with intent to
distribute (PWID) methamphetamine. He pled guilty to the charge of
misrepresenting his identity, and was convicted of the marijuana and
methamphetamine charges. Harrison appeals asserting the trial court erred in (1)
admitting evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop because the basis of the
stop was a ruse and the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable
cause; (2) admitting the marijuana and methamphetamine evidence because the
officers exceeded the appropriate parameters for a warrantless search; and (3)
admitting the methamphetamine evidence because the State failed to establish a
complete chain of custody. We affirm.

1. We find no error in the trial court's admission of evidence obtained as a
result of the traffic stop. First, we note trial counsel did not argue to the trial court
that the stop, being based upon the broken windshield, was an improper basis or
was some type of ruse. We further note Harrison did not object to the trial court's
ruling that the traffic stop provided an independent basis for the stop, such that a
reasonable suspicion analysis for an investigatory stop was not necessary. Thus, it
is questionable whether this argument is properly preserved. See State v.
Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. 609, 617, 690 S.E.2d 565, 570 (2010) (holding an objection
must be made on a specific ground, and for an issue to be properly preserved it has
to be raised to and ruled on by the trial court). Regardless, we find no error, as
there is sufficient evidence that the traffic stop was proper based upon the officer's
observation of a cracked windshield. See State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 252, 639
S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006) ("The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."); see
also State v. Corley, 392 S.C. 125, 126-27 n.2, 708 S.E.2d 217, 217-18 n.2 (2011)
(Corley II) (noting, where officer observed certain actions by defendant raising
officer's suspicion and causing officer to follow defendant in car, and officer
initiated traffic stop after observing defendant failing to use a turn signal, the
traffic violation served as an independent basis for the vehicle stop); State v.
Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 240, 679 S.E.2d 187, 191-92 (Ct. App. 2009) (Corley I),
aff'd as modified, 392 S.C. 125, 708 S.E.2d 217 (2011) (holding a minor traffic
violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact it was a "mere pretext for
a narcotics search").

2. We find no error in the trial court's admission of the marijuana and
methamphetamine evidence based on Harrison's argument the officers exceeded
the appropriate parameters for a warrantless inventory search. First, we again find
it questionable whether Harrison's appellate argument regarding the opening of
closed containers resulting from inventory searches and the requirement of a
department policy on the matter, is preserved for review, as it is not clear that trial
counsel raised this argument to the trial court. Even assuming, as Harrison
contends, the specific grounds are apparent from the record, it is clear that the trial
court did not rule on the issue of opening closed containers during inventory
searches and the requirement of policies on the matter. See State v. Dunbar, 356
S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (holding, in order for an issue to be
preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the
trial court; issues not so raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be
considered on appeal). Additionally, when trial counsel moved to suppress the
drug evidence based upon the officers' failure to obtain a search warrant, and the
trial court ruled that the can simply fell apart, thus indicating there was no search
of the can, trial counsel did not argue against the court's ruling, but apparently
accepted this basis for denying the motion to suppress. Trial counsel never argued
to the trial court that the evidence did not support the court's determination that the
can simply fell apart, nor did he argue that the can only fell apart because the
officer improperly shook the can. Thus, these arguments made by Harrison on
appeal are not preserved for review. See State v. Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 16, 482
S.E.2d 760, 765 (1997) (noting an issue is not preserved for review if the objecting
party accepts the judge's ruling and does not contemporaneously make an
additional objection). At any rate, we find the evidence in the record supports the
trial court's ruling that the can simply fell apart, thereby revealing the drugs in
question. See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 583, 698 S.E.2d 596, 601 (2010)
(noting the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion; an abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court's conclusions either lack evidentiary support
or are controlled by an error of law).

3. We find no error in the trial court's admission of the methamphetamine
evidence based on Harrison's argument the State failed to establish a complete
chain of custody of the substance from the time it was seized until it was analyzed.
In regard to the argument concerning the four-month period the evidence was at
SLED, the law provides a party offering fungible items such as drugs or blood
samples into evidence must establish a complete chain of custody as far as
practicable. State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91, 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011). The
police need not account for every hand-to-hand transfer of a fungible item; rather,
it is sufficient if the evidence demonstrates a reasonable assurance the condition of
the item remains the same from the time it was obtained until the time it is
introduced at trial. Id. at 94, 708 S.E.2d at 754. As to Harrison's assertion the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence based upon admittedly
inaccurate information presented by the State concerning the custody of the
evidence on May 9 and 10, 2006, while in custody of officers with the Saluda
County Sheriff's Office, we likewise find no error. Harrison contends there is
inconsistency in the evidence as to who placed the item in the drop box and when,
and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. This
argument does not involve a missing link in the chain. Rather, it involves a
discrepancy in regard to the evidence. "Courts have abandoned inflexible rules
regarding the chain of custody and the admissibility of evidence in favor of a rule
granting discretion to the trial courts." Id. Whether the chain of custody has been
established as far as practicable depends on the unique factual circumstances of
each case. Id. "The ultimate goal of chain of custody requirements is simply to
ensure that the item is what it is purported to be." Id. at 95, 708 S.E.2d at 755.
Further, where the identity of persons handling a specimen is established, our
courts have found evidence regarding its care goes only to the weight of the
fungible item as credible evidence, and "[w]here there is a weak link in the chain
of custody, as opposed to a missing link, the question is only one of credibility and
not admissibility. " State v. Carter, 344 S.C. 419, 424, 544 S.E.2d 835, 837
(2001); see also State v. Johnson, 318 S.C. 194, 196, 456 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ct.
App. 1995) (holding, although a discrepancy existed as to the dates the evidence
custodian received the drug evidence from the detective, no evidence was
presented to indicate the drugs were not within the control of identifiable people
during the entire time, and a reconciliation of the discrepancy was not necessary to
establish the chain of custody, but merely reflected upon the credibility of the
evidence rather than its admissibility). Here, the identity of persons handling the
evidence was established and there was no evidence presented to indicate the
fungible item was not within the control of identifiable people during the entire
time. The discrepancy in regard to the evidence did not render the drug evidence
inadmissible, but reflected only on the credibility of the evidence. Accordingly,
we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the chain of custody
sufficient under the unique facts of this case.

For the foregoing reasons, Harrison's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.