Harwell v. Cumbee

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Sharon Harwell, Appellant,

v.

Kendrick
Cumbee, Patrick Cumbee, and Pamela S. Laury, Defendants,

Of Whom Pamela
S. Laury is, Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

 J. Michelle Childs, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2012-UP-150

Heard February 15, 2012 – Filed March 7,
2012

AFFIRMED

Paige Blair George, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Robert A. McKenzie, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Appellant
Sharon Harwell appeals from an order of the circuit court granting Respondent
Pamela S. Laury's motion for summary judgment on causes of action related to
injuries Harwell suffered from a dog bite.  On appeal, Harwell argues the trial
court erred by failing to (1) address her cause of action for negligence; (2)
address her argument that Laury's property was not in a fit and habitable
condition because it was unfenced; (3) interpret the legislative intent of the
statute providing liability for dog bites; and (4) permit a cause of action for
negligent leasing or entrustment of real property.  We find no error of law in
the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, and therefore, we affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Nicholson v. Nicholson, 378 S.C. 523, 537, 663 S.E.2d 74, 82 (Ct. App. 2008) ("An
issue is not preserved where the trial court does not explicitly rule on an
argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend
the judgment." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mitchell
by Mitchell v. Bazzle,
304 S.C. 402, 405, 404 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding a landlord is
not liable under the common law for injuries caused by a tenant's dog, even
when the landlord knows of the animal's vicious propensities and has the right
to cancel the tenant's lease); Bruce v. Durney, 341 S.C. 563, 571, 534 S.E.2d 720, 725
(Ct. App. 2000) (holding a landlord's statutory duty to keep the leased
premises in a fit and habitable condition applies to the inherent physical
qualities of the premises and does not alter the common law rule that a
landlord is not vicariously liable for the actions of a tenant's dog (citation
omitted)); Clea v. Odom, 394 S.C. 175, 180, 714 S.E.2d 542, 545 (2011) (finding
a property owner is strictly liable for injuries from a dog bite only when the
property owner exercises control over, and assumes responsibility for, the care
and keeping of the dog); Mitchell, 304 S.C. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 912
(finding "no authority imposing liability upon a landlord based upon a
theory of negligent rental or entrustment of land").

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS,
and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.