State v, Leggette

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dominic Alexander Leggette, Appellant.

Appeal From Georgetown County

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-203

Submitted March 1, 2012 – Filed March 28,
2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dominic
Alexander Leggette appeals his convictions of voluntary manslaughter and
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State did not
disprove self-defense.  We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d
641, 648 (2006) (stating an appellate court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State on review of a
denial of a directed verdict); id. ("When ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or
nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) ("[W]hen
a defendant claims self-defense, the State is required to disprove the elements
of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt."); id. ("A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense
when: (1) The defendant was without
fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) The defendant . . . actually believed
he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily
injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger; (3) If the defense is based
upon the defendant's actual belief of imminent danger, a reasonabl[y] prudent
man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief . .
. ; and (4) The defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the
danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act
as he did in this particular instance."); State v. Wiggins,
330 S.C. 538, 546, 500 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998) (finding, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that the State presented
sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding self-defense); State v.
Long, 325 S.C. 59, 63, 480 S.E.2d 62, 63-64 (1997) (holding a trial court
properly refused to direct a verdict in defendant's favor based on self-defense
when the evidence of self-defense was not conclusive but raised questions for
the jury); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214, 697 S.E.2d 681, 683
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[U]nless it can be said as a matter of law that self-defense
was established, it [is] not error for the trial court to submit the case to
the jury.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.