State v. Greene

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antjuan T. Greene, Appellant.

Appeal From Abbeville County

Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-001

Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed January
4, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior
Deputy Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Antjuan
T. Greene appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary, criminal domestic
violence of a high and aggravated nature (CDVHAN), and malicious injury to real
property.  Greene argues the trial court erred (1) in denying his directed
verdict motions on his CDVHAN and first-degree burglary charges and (2) in admitting
unduly prejudicial photographs into evidence.  We affirm.[1]

1.  We find the record contains sufficient evidence upon which the
trial court could have relied in denying both of Greene's directed verdict
motions.  "When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court
is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its
weight."  State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648
(2006).  "If there is any direct evidence or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,
the [appellate] [c]ourt must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."  Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648. 

If a person commits a criminal domestic violence offense and the
elements of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) are
present, that person is guilty of CDVHAN.  State v. Sullivan, 362 S.C.
373, 375, 608 S.E.2d, 422, 424 (2005).  "ABHAN is 'an unlawful act of
violent injury' accompanied by a circumstance of aggravation."  Id. at 375-76, 608 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576,
580, 564 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2002)).  Among the potential circumstances of
aggravation is serious bodily injury.  Id. at 376, 608 S.E.2d at 424.  As
to the CDVHAN charge, the State presented testimony and photographs showing the
victim suffered three separate nose fractures, a cut requiring four stitches, swelling
of the eyes to the point the victim could no longer see, and multiple other
scrapes and bruises as a result of Greene's attack.  Based on this testimony
and photographs submitted at trial, the State presented evidence that
reasonably tended to prove the victim suffered serious bodily injury. 
Accordingly, the record contains sufficient evidence the trial court could rely
on in denying Greene's motion for a directed verdict. 

As to the burglary charge, we initially note Greene's argument
concerning the victim consenting to Greene's entry into the home was never raised
to or ruled upon by the trial court; therefore, it is not preserved for review.
 See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694
(2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground
on appeal.").  Concerning the portion of Greene's argument that is
preserved, "[a] person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the
person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in
the dwelling, and . . . while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he . . .
causes physical injury to a person who is not a participant in the crime." 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A)(1)(b) (2003).  Because intent is generally not
susceptible to proof by direct evidence, it ordinarily must be inferred from
circumstantial evidence.  State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185
S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971).  Here, the State presented testimony stating Greene
repeatedly beat and kicked the victim's door and pushed aside a clothes dryer
just to gain entry to the home.  Moreover, the victim testified, upon entering
her home, Greene immediately came towards her and began his assault.  Based on
this testimony, the State presented evidence reasonably tending to prove Greene
intended to commit a crime upon entering the victim's home.  Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying Greene's directed verdict motion on the
first-degree burglary charge. 

2.  We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting into evidence photographs showing the victim's injuries.  "The
relevance, materiality and admissibility of photographs are matters within the
sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling will be disturbed only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion."  State v. Rosemond, 335 S.C.
593, 596, 518 S.E.2d 588, 589-90 (1999).  Relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice."  Rule 403, SCRE.  Photographs entered into evidence
will be considered unfairly prejudicial when they create an undue tendency to
suggest an improper basis for a decision, usually based on emotion.  State
v. Jackson, 364 S.C. 329, 334, 613 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2005).  Such photographs
which are "calculated to arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury
should be excluded if they are irrelevant or not necessary to substantiate
material facts or conditions."  Id.  "If [a] photograph serves
to corroborate testimony, it is not an abuse of discretion to admit it."  Rosemond,
355 S.C. at 597, 518 S.E.2d at 590.  One of the aggravating circumstances that
can lead to a conviction for CDVHAN is serious bodily injury.  See Sullivan,
362 S.C. at 375-76, 608 S.E.2d at 424.  Although the photographs in question
depict blood due to the victim's injuries following her assault, the nature of
these injuries is very probative as to whether the serious bodily injury
circumstance has been fulfilled such that Greene could be convicted of CDVHAN. 
Additionally, the photographs serve to corroborate the testimony of several
witnesses as to the nature and severity of the victim's injuries.  Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victim's injuries. 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.