SCDSS v. Joseph M.

CourtListener 10154426Scctapp13 de jan. de 2012

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THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Amanda B.;
Tywon J.; Joseph M., Jr.; John Doe (whose true name is unknown); and John Roe
(whose true name is unknown), Defendants,

Of whom, Joseph
M., Jr., is the, Appellant.

In the interest
of three minor children under the age of eighteen (18) years.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

 James F. Fraley, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-009

Submitted January 1, 2012 – Filed January
13, 2012   

AFFIRMED

Carlos C. Johnson, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Deborah  Murdock, of Mauldin, for Respondent.

Michael Todd Thigpen, of Spartanburg, for Guardian Ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Joseph
M., Jr., appeals the family court's final
order terminating his parental rights (TPR) to his minor child, arguing the
family court erred in: 1) finding he was properly served the Summons and
Complaint for TPR; 2) finding he made a general appearance, thereby waiving any
defect in service; and 3) improperly proceeding with the trial without having personal
jurisdiction over him.  We affirm.[1]

1.  We
find the family court did not err in finding Father was properly served the
Summons and Complaint for TPR.  See Roche
v. Young Bros. of Florence, 318 S.C. 207,
209-10, 456 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1995) ("Rule 4, SCRCP[,] serves at least two purposes.  It confers personal
jurisdiction on the [family] court and assures the defendant of reasonable
notice of the action.  We have never required exacting
compliance with the rules to effect service of process."); id. at 211, 456 S.E.2d at 900 ("When the
civil rules on service are followed, there is a presumption of proper
service." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ex parte S.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, 350 S.C. 404, 407, 566 S.E.2d 196, 198 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The
[family] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party will not be
disturbed on appeal unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or manifestly
influenced or controlled by error of law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   

2.  Because our
ruling on the first issue is dispositive as to service, we need not address the
issue of whether Father waived service by voluntarily appearing.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining
issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). 

3.  We find the
family court did not err in proceeding with the trial because it obtained
personal jurisdiction through proper service.  See BB&T v. Taylor,
369 S.C. 548, 551, 633 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2006) ("A
[family] court generally obtains personal jurisdiction by the service of a
summons.").

AFFIRMED. 

HUFF,
PIEPER, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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