State v. Hammond

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Mokeia Hammond, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-476  

Submitted October 1, 2011 – Filed October
26, 2011

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L.
Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
John McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Mokeia
Hammond appeals her conviction for armed robbery, arguing the circuit court
erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to
present any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that Hammond was more
than merely present when the robbery occurred.  We affirm.[1]

An appellate court reviews
the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Weston,
367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "If there is any direct
evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove
the guilt of the accused, [an appellate court] must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury."  Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648.  The
circuit court may not consider the weight of the evidence.  Id. at 292,
625 S.E.2d at 648.  A circuit court should grant a directed verdict motion when
the evidence merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty.  State v.
Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001).  "Under the 'hand
of one is the hand of all' theory [of accomplice liability], one who joins with
another to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable
criminally for everything done by his confederate incidental
to the execution of the common design and purpose." State v. Condrey,
349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App. 2002).  Mere presence and
prior knowledge a crime was going to be committed, without more, is
insufficient to constitute guilt.  Id. at 195, 562 S.E.2d at 325.  However,
"presence at the scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or
abet in the perpetration of the crime constitutes guilt as a [principal]."
 State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 395-96, 234 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1977). 

In viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, substantial circumstantial evidence
existed showing Hammond's guilt.  See Weston, 367 S.C. at 292-93,
625 S.E.2d at 648.  Another passenger in the car testified he heard the
announcement they were going to "do a lick" and understood this to
mean they were going to commit a robbery.  After this announcement, Hammond
continued to drive to the parking lot to meet the victim and then drove the car
away from the scene after the robbery and shooting occurred.  While mere
presence and prior knowledge a crime was going to be committed are not enough
to find a defendant guilty, here, Hammond continued to act as driver after her
co-defendant stated his criminal intentions and after the crime was committed. 
Because Hammond knew of the plan in advance, was present, and aided in the
commission of the crime by driving, substantial circumstantial evidence existed
that reasonably tended to prove Hammond's guilt.  Accordingly, the circuit court
did not err in denying Hammond's motion for a directed verdict.

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J.,
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.