State v. Murray

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Donovan Terrell
Murray, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-424

Submitted April 1, 2011 – Filed September
20, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark Farthing, all of Columbia; Solicitor
Scarlett A. Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donovan
Terrell Murray appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine within
the proximity of a school, arguing the trial court erred in admitting (1) his
statements in violation of his Miranda[1] rights and (2) evidence and testimony regarding his possession of prescription
drugs without a prescription in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b), SCRE.  We affirm.[2]

1.  The trial court properly admitted Murray's
three statements regarding the prescription pills.  Murray was not in custody
at the time of his first two statements, when he made statements regarding the
entry of officers into the hotel room or when he spoke with Officer Patricia Jourdan
concerning his lack of prescription for the pills.  Therefore, the officers
were not required to administer Miranda warnings.  See State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 121,
127, 489 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1997) (holding Miranda rights are required
only in situations involving custodial interrogation, in which a suspect is
taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant way); see
also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78 ("General on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the
fact-finding process is not affected by our holding."); State v. Whitner, 380 S.C. 513, 518, 670
S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding custodial interrogation requires both
custody and interrogation initiated by the law). 

Additionally, Murray's third
statement, made after being handcuffed, was admissible because his statements
were voluntary and not in response to interrogation.  See State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 25, 339 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1986)
("In order to secure the admission of a defendant's statement, the State
must affirmatively show the statement was voluntary and taken in
compliance with Miranda.") (emphasis added); State v. Kennedy, 325
S.C. 295, 307, 479 S.E.2d 838, 844 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding an oral admission
not in response to any interrogation is voluntary); State v. Sprouse,
325 S.C. 275, 282, 478 S.E.2d 871, 875 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding the requirement
for Miranda warnings do not apply to voluntary statements that are not
part of interrogation).

2.  The trial
court did not err in admitting evidence and testimony regarding Murray's
possession of prescription drugs without a prescription in violation of Rules 403
and 404(b), SCRE.  See State v.
Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001) ("The
admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
[court], whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion."); Anderson
v. State, 354 S.C. 431,
435, 581, S.E.2d 834, 836 (2003) (holding evidence of other crimes is admissible under the res gestae theory when the other actions are so intimately connected with
the crime charged that their admission is necessary for a full presentation of
the case).  

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.