State v. Coleman

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Charles Edward Coleman, Appellant.

Appeal From Edgefield County

 R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-U-381

Submitted June 7, 2011 – Filed August 4,
2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy John McIntosh,
Assistant Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General
William M. Blitch, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Charles Coleman was convicted of three counts of
assault and battery with intent to kill and one count of carjacking.  He
contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to quash the
carjacking indictment; (2) admitting evidence of medical treatment prescribed
to victims; (3) denying his motion for a directed verdict; (4) not providing
the jury with the option of finding Coleman not guilty by reason of insanity;
and (5) not properly charging the jury on assault and battery of a high and
aggravated nature.[1] 
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether
the trial court erred in denying Coleman's motion to quash the carjacking
indictment: Patrick v. State, 349 S.C. 203, 209, 562 S.E.2d 609, 612
(2002) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that
prosecutorial retaliation was the motive for bringing the additional charges).

2. As
to whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of medical treatment
prescribed to Coleman's victims:  State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502
S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998) (holding that malice is "the wrongful intent to
injure another and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on wrongdoing"); State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 16 n.4, 479 S.E.2d 50, 52 n.4 (1996) ("[E]vidence of the character of the means or instrument
used, manner in which it was used, purpose to be accomplished, resulting wounds
or injuries . . . are admissible to show the intent with which the assault was
committed.").  

3. As
to whether the trial court erred in denying Coleman's directed verdict motion: State
v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,
the Court must find the case was
properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 653, 572 S.E.2d 267, 273 (2002). 

4. As
to whether the trial court erred in ruling not to instruct the jury on the
option of finding Coleman not guilty by reason of insanity: State v. Dickman, 341
S.C. 293, 295, 534 S.E.2d 268, 269 (2000) (holding that a party may not argue
one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal); State v.
Lewis, 328 S.C. 273, 278, 494 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1997) ("A requested charge on insanity is properly refused where
there is no evidence tending to show the defendant was insane at the time of
the crime charged.").

5. As
to whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that the absence
of malice is not an element of ABHAN: State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106,
119, 631 S.E.2d 244, 251 (2006) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (holding that a
trial judge is required to charge only "the current and correct law of
South Carolina"); Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d
462, 472 (2004). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., PIEPER, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.