David A. Hauge & Chidna v. Curran

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

David A. Hauge & Chidna, L.L.C., Plaintiffs,

of whom David A. Hauge is, Appellant,

v.

Adrienne Curran, Respondent.

Appeal From Charleston County

Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-264  

Submitted April 1, 2011 – Filed June 7,
2011

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, and REMANDED

Mary
L. Arnold, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.

Thomas
R. Goldstein, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: David Hauge ("Hauge")
appeals the trial court's order denying summary judgment and dismissing the
action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8), SCRCP.  Hauge first argues
Adrienne Curran ("Curran") conceded the funds generated from the sale
of property owned by Chidna, L.L.C. were not Curran's personal property.  Therefore,
based on Curran's admission, Hauge argues there is no genuine issue of material
fact as to the conversion or breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, and
summary judgment should have been granted.  Second, Hauge contends the trial
court improperly dismissed the South Carolina action because the pending Florida
litigation between Hauge and Curran is not another action pending between the
same parties for the same claim under Rule 12(b)(8).  Finally, Hauge asserts
the trial court improperly overruled the prior trial court judge's order
denying Curran's motion to dismiss.  Pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR and the
following authorities,[1] we affirm the trial court's decision to deny summary judgment, reverse its
decision to dismiss the South Carolina action, and remand the matter for
further proceedings.

1. As to whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists on the conversion and breach of fiduciary
duty causes of action: See Moore v. Weinberg,  383
S.C. 583, 589, 681 S.E.2d 875, 878-79 (2009) (finding conflicting
testimony regarding the ownership of an interest in the proceeds from
litigation created a genuine issue of material fact as to the conversion
claim); Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 340, 611
S.E.2d 485, 488 (2005) ("Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.'"); Gadson v. Hembree, 364 S.C. 316, 320, 613 S.E.2d
533, 535 (2005) ("Summary judgment is not appropriate where further
inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of
the law."); Ellis v. Davidson, 358 S.C. 509, 520, 595 S.E.2d 817,
823 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating summary judgment is not proper when genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether a fiduciary duty existed between
the parties and, if so, whether such duty was breached); Baughman v. Am.
Tel. and Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112, 410 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1991) (finding
summary judgment was improper when plaintiffs had not been afforded a full and
fair opportunity to complete discovery).

2. As to whether
the trial court properly applied Rule 12(b)(8), SCRCP to dismiss a South
Carolina circuit court action on the ground that a similar action is
simultaneously pending between the same parties in another jurisdiction: See Poston v.
Homes Ins. Co. of N.Y., 191 S.C. 314, 317-18, 4 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1939) ("[A]n action
may be pleaded in abatement of a second suit only when between the same parties
and in the same jurisdiction and with the same object.") (emphasis
added); see also Logan v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. Co., 82
S.C. 518, 520-21, 64 S.E. 515, 516 (1909) (stating that a pending action in the
federal court against the lessee of a railroad for personal injuries is no bar
to an action in the state courts against the lessor on the same cause of action
because the suits are against different parties and in different jurisdictions); Hill v. Hill, 51 S.C. 134, 137, 28 S.E. 309, 310 (1897) (holding that the
pendency of a former suit between the same parties for the same cause and
relief is a ground for abatement of a subsequent suit if both suits are pending
in the same jurisdiction, but that it is a well-established doctrine that the
pendency of another suit in a foreign jurisdiction cannot be grounds for
abatement of an action in the domestic forum).

3. In light of our
determination that the action was improperly dismissed, we need not address Hauge's
remaining exception regarding the allegedly conflicting trial court rulings. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591,
598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when a
decision on a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED
IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and
LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.