State v. Cheeks

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Thomas Cheeks, Appellant.

Appeal From Laurens County

J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-298 

Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed June 14,
2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Thomas B. Cheeks, Jr. appeals his
conviction for statutory escape.  On
appeal, Cheeks contends the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.  Specifically,
Cheeks argues the State failed to prove the elements of statutory escape
because he was in the process of being arrested and not in confinement.  We affirm.[1]

"When ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or
nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."  State v. Weston, 367
S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  When reviewing a denial of a
directed verdict, an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the State.  Id.  If any direct
evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to prove the
guilt of the accused, the appellate court must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury.  Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648.

Under section 24-13-410 of the South Carolina Code (2007),
"[i]t is unlawful for a person, lawfully confined in prison or upon the
public works of a county or while in the custody of a
superintendent, guard, or officer, to escape . . . ."  (emphasis
added).  A definition of "custody" is "detention of a person by
virtue of lawful process or authority."  Black's Law Dictionary 442
(9th ed. 2009).

In Bing v. Harvey, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that an "appellant's escape from lawful
pretrial custody violated the statutory offense of escape."  274 S.C. 216,
217-18, 262 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1980) (noting initially that "[a]ppellant
escaped from the lawful pretrial custody" of the Sherriff and then stating
that there was "no question" that "appellant was 'being lawfully
confined' at the time of his escape," the court allowed an inference that
a person in lawful pretrial custody is lawfully confined). 

The State presented
sufficient evidence to meet the elements of the escape statute.  Cheeks
stipulated he was lawfully arrested.  The State produced evidence that an
officer arrested Cheeks for a traffic violation, handcuffed him, and
transferred him to another officer's custody.  The second officer
transported Cheeks to the police department for booking and placement in jail. 
At the police department, the officer removed Cheeks's handcuffs to complete
the booking process.  Cheeks ran out the door of the building and was
apprehended by the officer, after a foot chase, in the field across the
building.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence supported submitting the case to the jury.

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.