Squires v. SLED

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Charles Rodney
Squires, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division, Respondent.

Appeal From Horry County

J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-218

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 17, 2011

AFFIRMED

William B. Von Herrmann, of Conway, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer,
and Assistant Attorney General Geoffrey K. Chambers, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Charles Rodney Squires
appeals the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender. 
He argues the trial court erred because (1) the South Carolina Code pardons him
"from all the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction";
(2) the registration requirement deprives him of the fundamental fairness
required by due process; and (3) the doctrine of laches estopped the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) from enforcing the registration
requirement against him.  We affirm[1] pursuant to rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the South Carolina Code pardons Squires from the
registration requirement: State v. Taub, 336 S.C. 310, 317, 519
S.E.2d 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The
general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over
a more general one." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. Code
Ann. § 23-3-430(E)-(F) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (requiring re-registration as a
sex-offender where the offender's guilty plea was not "reversed, overturned,
or vacated on appeal" or the offender's pardon failed to specifically
state the pardon was "based on a finding of not guilty").

2.  As
to whether the registration requirement deprives Squires of the fundamental
fairness required by due process: Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 484-85, 636
S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental
fairness are "usually
deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects
an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor, 353 S.C. 542, 552, 579
S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process
challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed
to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration
requirement (citation omitted)).

3. As to whether the
doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement
against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The
appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record
on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State, 352
S.C. 215, 219, 574 S.E.2d 200, 202
(2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party
asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury,
prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and
THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.