In the Matter of Thomas Simmons

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of
the Care and Treatment of Thomas Simmons, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-121

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 24,
2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J.
Shupe, Senior Assistant Attorney General James G. Bogle, Jr., and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Thomas Simmons appeals his commitment to
the South Carolina Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator. 
On appeal, Simmons contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict because the State failed to prove an element of the Sexually
Violent Predator Act (the Act) and in allowing the opinion testimony of a
non-expert into evidence.  We affirm.[1]

1. The
trial court did not err in denying Simmons's motion for a directed verdict. 

A sexually
violent predator is defined in the Act as "a person who (a) has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term
control, care, and treatment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(1) (Supp. 2010). 
"Mental abnormality" is defined as "a mental condition affecting
a person's emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(3) (Supp.
2010).  The phrase "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" is
defined as a "propensity to commit acts of sexual violence . . . of such a
degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others."  S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-48-30(9) (Supp. 2010).  "When
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."  State v.
Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  When reviewing a
denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State.  Id. 

The State produced evidence
that Simmons met both elements of "sexually violent predator" as
defined in the Act.  Simmons met the first element of the Act because he was
adjudicated delinquent as a result of the commission of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct with a minor after he committed sexual battery on his
step-nephew.  Simmons met the second element of "sexually violent
predator" under the Act because the chief psychologist at the South
Carolina Violent Predator Program testified Simmons suffers from a mental
abnormality called sexual sadism, which he opined was a chronic condition. The
State presented evidence sufficient for a jury to find Simmons was likely to
"engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility
for long-term control, care, and treatment," including: Simmons continued
to have vivid sexual fantasies involving rape, force and sadistic behavior
while committed; Simmons lapsed in his sex‑offender treatment; while
committed, Simmons downloaded pornographic cartoons depicting rape and
violence; Simmons accumulated thirty disciplinary infractions while committed,
including fashioning a weapon and displaying signs of aggression toward other
juveniles and staff members; Simmons refused to pay restitution to his victim,
blamed the victim for his commitment, and believed the victim should have to
"pay for me"; and Simmons stated he "was always listening to the
wrong voice."  Thus, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports
submitting the case to the jury. 

2. The trial court did
not err in allowing the social worker to testify about her personal
observations of Simmons. 

Lay witnesses are permitted
to offer "testimony in the form of opinions or inferences" if the
opinions or inferences "(a) are rationally based on the perception of the
witness, (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'[s] testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) do not require special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training."  Rule 701, SCRE.  "Conclusions
or opinions of laymen should be rejected only when they are superfluous in the
sense that they will be of no value to the jury."  State v. Williams,
321 S.C. 455, 463, S.E.2d 49, 54 (1996). 

The State presented evidence
the social worker's testimony was based on her perception.  The question that
was objected to, which she answered, asked whether she had personally observed
Simmons display certain features.  Her answer was helpful to the determination
of the fact in issue of whether Simmons was likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment.  Lastly, her personal observations did not require special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training. 

Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in allowing the social worker to testify.  

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.