State v. Boyd

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jackie Lee Boyd, Appellant.

Appeal From Pickens County

 Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-070

Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed
February 23, 2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W.
McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Walt Wilkins,
of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jackie Lee Boyd appeals his conviction for
trafficking in cocaine, arguing the
circuit court erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict.  He
contends the State only raised a "mere suspicion" that he knowingly
possessed the drugs.  We
affirm.[1]

An
appellate court reviews the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
State.  State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). 
"If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [an appellate court] must
find the case was properly submitted to the jury."  Id. at 292-93,
625 S.E.2d at 648.  The circuit court may not consider the weight of the
evidence.  Id. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648.  However, when the evidence
"merely raises a suspicion" of guilt, a directed verdict is proper.  State
v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001).  A mere suspicion
is a belief that is inspired by "facts or circumstances which do not
amount to proof."  Id.

Trafficking
in cocaine occurs when a person is "knowingly in actual or constructive
possession" of "ten grams or more of cocaine or any mixtures
containing cocaine."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e), (e)(2) (2002).  Constructive
possession can be established by circumstantial evidence.  State v. Brown,
267 S.C. 311, 315, 227 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1976).  "'[T]he State must show a
defendant had dominion or control, or the right to exercise dominion or
control.'"  State v. Muhammed, 338 S.C. 22, 26, 524 S.E.2d 637, 639
(Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Hudson, 277 S.C. 200, 202, 284 S.E.2d
773, 774-75 (1981)).

Here, substantial circumstantial evidence existed showing Boyd
knowingly possessed the requisite amount of cocaine.  Specifically, the arresting officer testified he
discovered a medicine bottle containing drugs in the grass next to the driver's
side door.  Labs tests determined the
contents of the medicine bottle to be 10.90 grams of cocaine and 4.37 grams of
crack cocaine.  The only other passenger in the vehicle testified the medicine
bottle was in the vehicle prior to the stop.  She also said she did not throw
it from the vehicle.  This evidence, in
addition to Boyd's flight, his admission of recent drug use, and the drug
paraphernalia found on the driver's side of the vehicle, permits the jury to
reasonably infer guilt.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.