Miller v. SCDVR

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Brenda Miller, Appellant,

   v.

South Carolina
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Employer, State Accident Fund,
Carrier, Respondents.

Appeal From Richland County

Appellate Panel, Workers' Compensation
Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-002

Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed January
20, 2011

AFFIRMED

J. Marvin Mullis, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Cynthia Burns Polk, Matt Robertson, and
Ajerenal Danley, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Brenda Miller appeals the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission's order, contending the Commission erred in finding: (1) injuries to
certain body parts were not compensable; (2) she failed to prove compensability
for regional pain syndrome (RSD) of her right arm; and (3) Dr. Green Neal was not
authorized for payment or treatment.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following:

1. We find no reversible error in the
Commission's findings regarding compensability of certain body parts.  See Shealy
v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) (stating
that in workers' compensation cases, the Commission is the ultimate finder of
fact); Hoxit v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 304 S.C. 461, 465, 405 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1991) (finding where
there is conflicting evidence, the findings of fact of the Commission are
conclusive).

2. We likewise find no reversible
error in the Commission's finding of Miller's failure to prove compensability
for RSD.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(E) (Supp. 2009) (requiring an
employee to establish an injury arose in the course of employment by medical evidence
in medically complex cases); Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276
S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981) (finding this court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact); Pack
v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 381 S.C. 526, 536, 673 S.E.2d 461, 466-67 (Ct.
App. 2009) (finding the
Commission need not accept or believe medical or other expert testimony, even
when it is uncontroverted).

3. We affirm the Commission's finding
regarding payment of medical care by Dr. Neal.  See S.C. Code Ann. Regs.
67-509(A) (1990) ("The employer's representative chooses an authorized
health care provider and pays for authorized treatment."); Hall v.
United Rentals, Inc., 371 S.C. 69, 86-87, 636 S.E.2d 876, 885-86 (Ct. App.
2006) (discussing the rights and limitations of employers and employees in
choosing medical providers in workers' compensation actions); Clark v. Aiken
County Gov't, 366 S.C. 102, 114, 620 S.E.2d 99, 105 (Ct. App. 2005)
(explaining that although the claimant was justified in seeking treatment by an
unauthorized provider, the more appropriate procedure would have been to seek
an order from the Commission). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J.,
SHORT and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.