Sheep Island Plantation v. Bar-Pen Investments

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Sheep Island
Plantation, LLC, Appellant,

v.

Bar-Pen
Investments, LLC, Respondent.

Appeal From Berkeley County

Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-382

Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed August 4,
2010   

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Stephen V. Futeral and Thomas C. Nelson, of Mt. Pleasant, for
Appellant.

Charles S. Altman and William L. Howard, Sr., of Charleston, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This
case is decided pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.  Sheep Island Plantation, LLC
contends that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on Sheep
Island's breach of contract claim against Bar-Pen Investments, LLC.  We reverse
and remand.

Bar-Pen argues that this appeal should be dismissed because Sheep
Island's Rule 59 motion was untimely.  The trial court granted a directed
verdict on March 13, 2008, but the clerk of court did not send Sheep Island
written notice of the entry of judgment.  Sheep Island filed a Rule 59(e)
motion on March 31, 2008.  Because Sheep Island never received written notice
of the entry of judgment, the time for appeal did not begin to run until the
trial court denied Sheep Island's Rule 59(e) motion on May 8, 2008.  See Rule 59(f), SCRCP ("The time for appeal of all parties shall be stayed by
a timely motion under [Rule 59] and shall run from the receipt of written
notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motions.").  Thus,
Sheep Island timely served notice of its intent to appeal on May 15, 2008. 

After a careful review of the trial transcript and exhibits in the
light most favorable to Sheep Island, we find some evidence to support Sheep
Island's breach of contract claim.  In particular, the evidence supports more
than one inference regarding whether the Paragraph 33 extension clause is
invoked automatically, or whether notice is required.  Further, evidence exists
to support an inference that the letter of termination Bar-Pen sent to Sheep
Island on July 31, 2006, constitutes a repudiation.  In light of this evidence,
the trial court should have denied Bar-Pen's motion for directed verdict.  See Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002)
(holding that a trial court must deny a directed verdict motion "when the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt.").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FEW,
C.J., THOMAS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.