Charleston DSS v. Wendy J.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Charleston
County Department of Social Services, Respondent,

   v.

Wendy J. and
John Doe, Defendants,

Of Whom Wendy
J. is the Appellant.

In the interest of one minor child under the age of 18.

Appeal From Charleston County

Paul W. Garfinkel, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-366

Submitted December 1, 2009 – Filed July
14, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Brian C. Duffy, J. Rutledge Young, III,
and Lee Anne Walters, all of Charleston, for Appellant.

Bonnie T. Brisbane, of North Charleston,
for Respondent.

John F. Martin, of Charleston, Guardian Ad
Litem.

PER CURIAM:  Wendy J. (Mother) appeals the family court's final order terminating her
parental rights to her minor child (Child).  Mother contends the
family court erred in finding (1) Child was harmed by Mother and because of the
severity of abuse, it was not reasonably likely the home could be made safe;
(2) Mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal of Child;
(3) Mother failed to visit Child; (4) Mother failed to support Child; (5)
Mother abandoned Child; and (6) termination of parental rights (TPR) was in
Child's best interests.  We affirm.[1]

The grounds for TPR must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.  S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker,
336 S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999).  "Upon review, the
appellate court may make its own finding from the record as to whether clear
and convincing evidence supports the termination [of parental rights]."  S.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 609, 582 S.E.2d 419, 423
(2003).  However, despite our broad scope of review, we are not required to
disregard the findings of "the family court, who saw and heard the
witnesses, [and] was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and
assign comparative weight to their testimony."  Id.  The family court may order TPR upon finding one or
more of eleven statutory grounds is satisfied and also finding TPR is in the
best interests of the child.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010). 

We find clear and
convincing evidence supports the family court's findings that Mother failed to remedy
the conditions that led to the removal of child.[2] 
 See § 63-7-2570(2).  After DSS removed Child because Child tested
positive for cocaine at birth, Mother failed to enroll in a substance abuse program,
take parenting classes, or attempt to complete any other part of her
court-ordered treatment plan.  Instead, in the six-month period after Child's
removal, Mother, by her own admission, continued to take drugs and engage in
criminal behavior before she was convicted and imprisoned for third-degree burglary. 
Although it is commendable that Mother was making efforts to address her
problems while imprisoned by applying for enrollment in substance abuse and
parenting classes, she did not remedy the conditions that led to removal of
Child.  See Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Pritchett, 296 S.C.
517, 520, 374 S.E.2d 500, 501 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[A]n attempt to
remedy alone is [inadequate] to preserve parental rights.  Otherwise, the
statute would be couched in such terms. The attempt must have, in fact,
remedied the conditions."). Accordingly, the family court correctly found
sufficient statutory grounds for TPR.           

In a TPR case, the best
interests of the child are the paramount consideration.  S.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000). 
"The interests of the child shall prevail if the
child's interest and the parental rights conflict."  S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2620 (2010). 

We find clear and convincing
evidence in the record supports the family court's finding termination of
Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Mother has a history of
abusing drugs and criminal behavior stemming from her drug addiction. 
Additionally, Mother has no relationship with Child and does not have a
familial network to support her if Child is returned to her care.  In contrast,
Child's current foster care family is providing a stable and loving environment
for Child, and both Child's foster care worker and the guardian ad litem stated
Child was well-adjusted and was bonded with the foster care family. 
Additionally, Child's foster care family expressed interest in adopting Child,
and terminating Mother's parental rights would allow the adoption process to
proceed.  See Doe v. Roe, 386 S.C. 624, 634, 690 S.E.2d 573, 579
(2010) ("Overturning the family court's decision to terminate [parent's] rights
clearly conflicts with the TPR statute's purpose to make a child eligible for
adoption by someone 'who will provide a suitable home environment and the love
and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive life.'" (quoting
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010))).  Accordingly, the family court correctly
determined TPR was in Child's best interests.       

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS,
KONDUROS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]  Because we find Mother failed to remedy the
conditions that led to the removal of Child, we need not address the remaining
statutory grounds for TPR.  See Stinecipher v. Ballington, 366
S.C. 92, 100 n.6, 620 S.E.2d 93, 98 n.6 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating once one
statutory ground is met, this court need not address whether any other ground
for TPR has been proved).