Jones v. SCDC

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Dyshum M. Jones, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina
Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appeal From Administrative Law Court

Paige J. Gossett, Administrative Law Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-278

Submitted May 3, 2010 – Filed May 20, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Dyshum M. Jones, pro se, of Turbeville, for Appellant.

Christopher Florian, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dyshum
M. Jones appeals an Administrative Law Court (ALC) order affirming the South
Carolina Department of Correction's (the Department's) denial of his step-two
grievance.  Jones argues he should have received five years and four months of
work credit for his enrollment and participation in the mandatory educational
program to which the Department assigned him.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the ALC's
decision was clearly erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the
record as a whole: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2009) (stating the court
of appeals may reverse or modify the ALC's decision if "substantive rights
of the petitioner have been prejudiced"); S.C. Dep't of Corr. v.
Mitchell, 377 S.C. 256, 260, 659 S.E.2d 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2008)
(noting the burden rests squarely on the appellant when appealing an agency's
decision to prove that substantive rights were prejudiced).   

2.  As to whether Jones was
entitled to earn work credits for his participation in a mandatory educational
program: S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-230(A) (2007) (stating the Department may
allow any prisoner a "reduction from the term of his sentence of zero
to one day for every two days he is employed or enrolled").

3.  As to whether the
Department violated its own policies in failing to award him additional earned
work credit: Mitchell, 377 S.C. at 260, 659 S.E.2d at 235 ("[W]hen
appealing an agency's decision, the burden rests squarely on the appellant to
prove that substantive rights were prejudiced based on one of six statutory
criteria listed [in section 1-23-380(A)(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2009)].").

4.  As to whether Jones's Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection rights were violated: Rule
208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point will
be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal."); see also Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 373, 527
S.E.2d 742, 752 (2000) (holding the Department's disciplinary and grievance procedures
are consistent with the due process standards outlined by the United States
Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). 

5.  As to whether Jones's
First Amendment right of access to the court system was violated: Brown v.
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 519, 560 S.E.2d
410, 417 (2002) (stating issues not raised to
and ruled upon by the ALC are not preserved for appellate consideration). 
   

6.  As to whether Jones's
Eighth Amendment rights were violated: Mulherin-Howell v. Cobb, 362 S.C.
588, 600, 608 S.E.2d 587, 593-94 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting an issue is deemed abandoned
on appeal when no legal authority is cited to support the argument and the
argument itself is conclusory).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ.,
and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.