State v. Crabtree

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Steven B.
Crabtree, Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2010-UP-290

Submitted May 3, 2010 – Filed May 24, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of
Columbia; Solicitor Issac McDuffie Stone, III, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Steven
B. Crabtree appeals his conviction for third-degree burglary, arguing the trial
court erred in: (1) denying his motion to relieve counsel and (2) failing to
properly advise him regarding his right to self-representation.  We affirm.[1]          

1.  As to whether the trial
court erred in denying Crabtree's motion to relieve counsel:  The trial court
conducted a thorough investigation into the basis of Crabtree's complaints
against his trial counsel.  Although Crabtree certainly expressed disagreement
with his trial counsel's strategies and prospective defenses to the crime, none
of his objections prevented him from communicating with his attorney or
precluded trial counsel from preparing a zealous defense for him.  Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crabtree's motion to
relieve counsel.  See State v. Childers, 373 S.C. 367, 372, 645
S.E.2d 233, 235 (2007) ("A motion to relieve counsel is addressed to the
discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion."); State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 414, 405 S.E.2d 377,
380 (1991) (holding an appellate court may consider several factors in
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in a motion for
substitution of counsel: timeliness of the motion, adequacy of the trial
judge's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and whether the attorney-client
conflict was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication,
thereby preventing an adequate defense).     

2.  As to whether the trial
court erred in failing to properly advise Crabtree regarding his right to
self-representation:  Here, a review of the record indicates Crabtree did not
request to proceed pro se at any time during his trial.  Therefore, the trial
court did not err in failing to advise Crabtree regarding his right to
self-representation because it was not required to inform Crabtree of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation until Crabtree clearly
requested to proceed pro se.  See State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241,
523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999) ("A defendant's right to waive the assistance
of counsel is not unlimited. The request to proceed pro se must be clearly
asserted by the defendant prior to trial.").       

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J.,
THOMAS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] 
We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.