Ladson v. SCDC

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Willie Ladson, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina
Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appeal From Administrative Law Court

Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-258

Submitted April 1, 2010 – Filed April 23,
2010   

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Willie Ladson, pro se, for Appellant.

Robert Wesley Jacobs, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Willie Ladson appeals the Administrative
Law Court's (ALC's) affirmance of the Department of Corrections's (the
Department's) denial of Ladson's grievance seeking back wages for work
performed for the Department's prison industries program.  Ladson argues (1)
the ALC erred in finding he failed to timely file his prison grievance, and (2)
the ALC's dismissal of his prison grievance violated his right to due process.  We affirm as modified.[1]          

As
to Ladson's argument that the ALC erred in finding he failed to timely file his
prison grievance, review of the record reflects that Ladson did not suffer any
loss from the Department's denial of his grievance.  After filing his
grievance, Ladson received what he requested: the Department clearly
acknowledged in its replies to Ladson's grievances that "[the Department] may
very well owe [him] back wages" and indicated it was reviewing the pay
records to confirm the exact amount to award Ladson.  Accordingly, we affirm on
the ground that Ladson was not prejudiced by the Department's response to his
grievance because it neither granted nor denied the relief he sought.  SCACR
220(c) ("The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision, or
judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."); Moorhead
v. First Piedmont Bank and Trust Co., 273 S.C. 356, 360, 256 S.E.2d 414,
416 (1979) ("[T]his court may affirm upon any ground appearing in the
record . . . irrespective of the ground stated by the trial judge."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2009)[2] (emphasis added) ("A party who has exhausted all administrative remedies
available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in
a contested case is entitled to judicial review.").  If Ladson becomes
aggrieved by a final decision in his case, he will be entitled to judicial
review.

As
to Ladson's contention that the ALC's ruling violated his right to due process,
Ladson was provided the opportunity to pursue his prison grievance through the
prison's internal proceedings, an appeal to the ALC, and an appeal to this
court.  Accordingly, Ladson has been afforded his due process rights.  See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 373, 527 S.E.2d 742, 752 (2000) (holding
the Department's disciplinary and grievance procedures comply with minimal due
process requirements).

AFFIRMED AS
MODIFIED.

HUFF,
THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]  An inmate may seek judicial review of the
Department's final decision in an administrative matter under the provisions
for contested cases contained in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 369, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000).