State v. Gilliam

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Danny Ray
Gilliam, Appellant.

Appeal From Pickens County

 John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-197

Submitted March 1, 2010 – Filed March 10,
2010

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Danny Ray Gilliam appeals his
conviction and sentence for petit larceny and first-degree burglary, arguing
the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case to enter
evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance and in denying Gilliam's motion
for a directed verdict.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  State v.
Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (holding in criminal
cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by
the factual findings of the circuit court unless clearly erroneous).

1.  As
to whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case to
enter evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance:  State v.
Humphery, 276 S.C. 42, 43, 274 S.E.2d 918, 918 (1981) (finding the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to reopen its
case-in-chief to submit evidence of an essential element of the offense charged
and specifically permitting reopening of grand larceny case to prove value of
stolen goods); State v. Hammond, 270 S.C. 347, 355-56, 242 S.E.2d 411,
415 (1978) (finding no prejudice where additional evidence submitted was merely
corroborative of other evidence).[2]

2.  As
to whether the trial court erred in denying Gilliam's motion for a directed
verdict:  Rule 19(a), SCRCrimP (stating the grant of a defense motion for
directed verdict of acquittal is proper only "if there is a failure of
competent evidence tending to prove the charge"); State v. Venters,
300 S.C. 260, 264, 387 S.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1990) (requiring an appellate court reviewing
a denial of a motion for a directed verdict to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State; finding submission to the jury proper if any
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, reasonably tends to prove the guilt
of the accused; and holding a trial court considering a motion for directed
verdict is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not with its weight); State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000) (necessitating
submission of the case to the jury if "any substantial evidence" has
been presented that reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt or from
which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced). 

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER and GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We decline to address Gilliam's argument that his two prior convictions should be
considered as one.  This issue is unpreserved because Gilliam did not raise
this issue to the trial court.  See State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C.
642, 651, 511 S.E.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding issues not raised to and
ruled on by the circuit court may not be raised for the first time on appeal).