State v. Christopher P. Cooper

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Christopher P. Cooper, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000457

Appeal From Lexington County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-294
Heard March 12, 2024 – Filed August 14, 2024

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth
Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Christopher P. Cooper appeals his convictions for first-degree
burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, kidnapping,
conspiracy, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.
On appeal, Cooper argues the circuit court erred in (1) excluding evidence the
victim approached and requested money from his brother, (2) not suppressing
statements he made to law enforcement that were involuntary, and (3) allowing the
victim to testify she recognized Cooper's voice at a bond hearing. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A Lexington County grand jury indicted Cooper for first-degree burglary,
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, kidnapping, conspiracy, and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The charges
arose out of a home invasion that occurred on July 27, 2017, in which Cooper and
his cousin were accused of breaking into the home of Victim, stealing over $1,000,
and sexually assaulting Victim.

Before the trial, the State moved to suppress any allegations that Victim solicited a
bribe from Cooper's brother, Earle Cooper (Brother). According to the State,
Brother visited Victim at the strip club where she worked approximately a year
after the July 2017 incident. Brother and Victim recognized each other. When
Brother offered Victim money, Victim attempted to have Brother removed from
the strip club and contacted the solicitor's office to inform them Brother had
contacted her and offered her money. Victim later went to Brother's place of
employment and recorded a conversation with Brother in which he explained he
wanted to help her. Victim believed Brother sincerely wanted to help, so she
informed the solicitor's office that she was not concerned about him contacting her
and continued to meet with him. Based on their meetings, Brother claimed Victim
indicated she would change her story or drop the charges against Cooper in
exchange for money. The State denied Victim ever offered to change her story or
drop the charges against Cooper. The meeting between Brother and Victim ceased
when they both reported the meeting to law enforcement.
In Brother's version of events, he went to the strip club where Victim worked and
left her a tip without knowing her identity. Afterwards, he was surprised to find a
note from her at his work asking him to call her. Discussions occurred about
money between Brother and Victim, but Brother contacted the solicitor's office
because he did not know how to proceed. The solicitor's office contacted the West
Columbia Police Department about the alleged bribery, and the Lexington County
Sheriff's Department investigated the allegations. Cooper argued the issue
presented a question of fact for the jury regarding Victim's character. He cited
State v. Finley,1 in which our supreme court ruled a tape-recorded conversation

1
300 S.C. 196, 387 S.E.2d 88 (1989).
should have been admitted into evidence because it was relevant to impeach the
victim on a material issue.

When the circuit court asked if Victim ever offered to change her story or drop the
charges, the State again denied that ever occurred. The circuit court stated it saw
this issue as "a double-edged sword" for Cooper because the jury could interpret an
attempt to pay Victim to change her testimony or drop the charges as an admission
of his guilt. The circuit court also stated it thought bringing in evidence of the
alleged bribery could divert the jury from the true substance of the case. After
considering the issue overnight, the circuit court refused to allow Cooper to
introduce evidence of the alleged bribery. The circuit court stated it believed
Finley was distinguishable from this case because Brother did not contact Victim
until a year after the crimes, no recorded conversation of Victim attempting to
extort Brother existed, Cooper confessed to the crimes, and Victim notified the
solicitor's office as soon as Brother contacted her. The circuit court also
considered the case of Vanover v. State,2 finding it was "factually contrary" to the
present case because it revolved around the admission of a prior allegation of the
victim in that case. The circuit court noted Vanover stated a court could exclude
evidence that could lead to "a trial within a trial" and might "confuse the issues and
mislead the jury," which the circuit court stated "could very well result in this case"
if the evidence of the alleged bribery was admitted. The circuit court stated it
would allow Cooper to proffer testimony on the matter at the appropriate time.
Before the trial began, the circuit court also conducted a hearing to determine the
admissibility of incriminating out-of-court statements Cooper made to law
enforcement. During the hearing, West Columbia Police Department Investigator
Jody Lee Putney testified they found Cooper at his place of work and Cooper
voluntarily agreed to go to the police department for an interview. Investigator
Putney stated they informed Cooper of his Miranda 3 rights when he arrived at the
police department, and he verified his signature appeared as that of the witness on
the form Cooper signed waiving his Miranda rights (the waiver form). On
cross-examination, Investigator Putney stated he did not remember Cooper
requesting an attorney for the interview.

2
433 S.C. 31, 40, 856 S.E.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2021) (finding testimony about
sexual abuse victim's allegedly false allegations of inappropriate conduct against a
teacher was not admissible under Rule 404(b), SCRE, as prior bad act when
prosecuting defendant for criminal sexual conduct with a minor).
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Investigator Christopher Morris testified the West Columbia Police Department did
not record suspect interviews. He stated he began the interview with Cooper by
having him sign the waiver form. Investigator Morris stated Cooper did not appear
under the influence of any drugs or alcohol during the interview, he did not notice
any physical or mental disabilities as he talked to Cooper, and Cooper seemed to
understand what Morris said to him. He testified he thought the interview
probably lasted less than two hours and Cooper never requested to make a phone
call or use the bathroom during the interview. Investigator Morris denied
threatening Cooper before providing Miranda warnings or promising him anything
to waive his Miranda rights. He stated he read the waiver form to Cooper, and
Cooper "waived his rights, signed and dated it." He stated Cooper described the
events of July 27, 2017, during the interview. Investigator Morris testified Cooper
never asked for an attorney and gave his verbal and written statement freely and
voluntarily. Investigator Bruce Wade also testified he was present in the interview
when Cooper gave his statement. He stated Cooper gave his statement voluntarily
and never requested an attorney during the interview.
Cooper testified he asked for an attorney three times: on the drive to the police
department before his interview, when Investigator Morris began questioning him
in the interview room, and when officers allegedly threatened him during his
interview. Cooper testified he was read his rights after giving his statement. On
cross-examination, Cooper stated he graduated high school and went to college for
one year. He agreed he initialed and signed the waiver form and wrote the
statement given to police. Cooper initially denied ever having been arrested
before, but he admitted he was arrested in 2016 for trafficking cocaine and
possession of a weapon during a violent crime when presented with evidence of the
arrest. He also acknowledged he signed the waiver form and statement during an
August 2016 interview regarding the previous arrest.

The circuit court considered the totality of the circumstances, stating the officers
testified no threats or promises were made to Cooper, nothing was withheld from
Cooper during the interview, and the interview lasted two hours at a normal
interview location. The circuit court found Cooper's age, education, mental or
physical condition, and conduct in court did not cause any concern. The circuit
court found the officers testified Cooper was advised of his rights before being
questioned, Cooper signed the waiver form, and Cooper was literate. The circuit
court acknowledged Cooper and the officers gave conflicting testimony about the
interview process, but it noted Cooper denied having been previously arrested
during his testimony even though he had been. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the circuit court held Cooper's statement was freely, voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently made, and therefore it was admissible as evidence.
During the trial, the officers testified that Cooper freely and voluntarily made his
statement to police after signing the waiver form, and the circuit court admitted
Cooper's written statement and signed waiver form into evidence over Cooper's
renewed objection.

At trial, Victim testified she could distinguish between the voices of the two men
who broke into her home and assaulted her. She stated she heard the voice of one
of the men later during a bond court hearing. Cooper objected to the testimony and
requested an in-camera hearing on the matter, which the circuit court allowed.
Cooper argued Victim's testimony should not be admitted because no procedure
had been followed to determine the accuracy of her voice identification. The
circuit court stated under Rule 901, SCRE, Victim "may be able to authenticate it,
based upon her hearing his voice there in court," and Cooper's counsel replied, "All
right, sir." The circuit court then read Rule 901(b)(5), SCRE, stating voice
identification was allowed, and Cooper's counsel stated, "You're correct on what
you're reading." When the circuit court stated it believed Victim could
authenticate Cooper's voice under Rule 901(b)(5), Cooper's counsel replied, "All
right," and when the circuit court asked if he disagreed with that reading of the
rule, Cooper's counsel replied, "I think that's exactly what that rule says."
The State indicated it intended to ask Victim if she could identify whether the
voice she heard belonged to anyone in the courtroom, and Cooper stated he did not
believe a foundation had been established for that question. The circuit court
responded that Victim could testify she heard the voice in the courtroom, and could
then identify the person with the voice. Cooper's counsel responded "that would be
accurate, Your Honor, if she says that." After the jury returned, Victim testified
she was able to distinguish the voices of the two men who broke into her house and
attacked her from each other, and that she heard the voice of one of the men in
bond court. Victim then identified Cooper as the man she recognized as her
assailant based on his voice at bond court. Victim stated there was no question in
her mind that the voice she heard at bond court was the voice of the man she heard
on July 27, 2017. Cooper did not object to the identification.

On cross-examination, Cooper's counsel asked Victim when she heard Cooper in
bond court. Victim testified she heard Cooper's voice at bond court when the judge
asked if he had any remarks. She stated she recognized his voice at bond court
because he spoke to her multiple times throughout the night of July 27, 2017. On
redirect examination, Victim again identified Cooper as the person whose voice
she recognized as that of one of her assailants.
Cooper proffered Brother's testimony regarding Victim's alleged bribery outside
the presence of the jury. Brother testified he met Victim at a strip club when she
sat down next to him and began talking. He stated when they realized who the
other was, Victim walked to the back of the strip club and Brother left. Brother
stated the next day Victim left a note with her name and phone number on his desk
at work. When he called the number, Victim met him at his place of work.
Brother recalled Victim telling him she needed $25,000 and that she would help
Cooper. Brother stated he told Victim he could probably get her $10,000 and
Victim told him to call her when he had the money. Brother later agreed to meet
Victim's husband. Brother testified Victim's husband told him he was "real
connected" and "could have something done to" Brother, but that if Brother gave
them $10,000, they would go away. He stated when he met Victim again she
showed him an email she sent to "victim's advocate people" stating she did not
"feel harmed" by Brother. Brother testified he called law enforcement to see if he
should give Victim some of the money, but they never responded to his calls. He
stated the Lexington County Sheriff's Department began investigating and took a
formal statement from him and his contact with Victim ended. Brother testified he
believed Victim was "[t]rying to get some money out of the situation."
On cross-examination, Brother acknowledged Victim approached him at the strip
club to thank him for giving her a tip. Brother agreed that, in the recording from
his meeting with Victim at his workplace, Victim told him she lost her house, was
raped, was stolen from, and felt unsafe going to work because of him coming into
the club. Brother acknowledged he told Victim he had fifty people doing whatever
he told them to do. He also acknowledged he told Victim he could get her $10,000
and that it was his idea to meet with her husband. The circuit court stated its ruling
regarding the evidence related to the alleged bribe remained the same after hearing
Brother's testimony.
The jury found Cooper guilty as indicted. The circuit court sentenced Cooper to
life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, thirty years' imprisonment for armed robbery,
thirty years' imprisonment for kidnapping, and five years' imprisonment for
conspiracy. 4 This appeal followed.

4
The circuit court did not impose a sentence for possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime because it imposed a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for first-degree burglary. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2015)
(stating the five-year sentence for possession of a weapon during the commission
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"An appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of
discretion standard and gives great deference to the trial court's ruling." State v.
Davis, 437 S.C. 93, 96, 876 S.E.2d 321, 322 (Ct. App. 2022). "A trial court abuses
its discretion when its conclusions either lack evidentiary support or are premised
on an error of law." Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Alleged Bribery
Cooper argues the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of bribery or extortion
committed by Victim. He maintains the evidence should have been admitted
because it was probative of Victim's credibility and admissible to impeach her
pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE. 5

We hold this issue is not preserved for appellate review because Cooper failed to
argue whether the evidence should have been admitted under Rule 403, SCRE,
which was the basis of the circuit court's ruling. The circuit court stated it believed
the evidence should be excluded because "it might confuse the issues and mislead
the jury," as is permissible reasoning under Rule 403. See Rule 403, SCRE
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). Because Cooper failed to address
this line of reasoning, instead only arguing the evidence should have been admitted
under Rule 404(b), the circuit court's ruling is the law of the case. See State v.
Black, 400 S.C. 10, 28, 732 S.E.2d 880, 890 (2012) (holding an unchallenged
ruling, right or wrong, becomes the law of the case and will not be considered by
the appellate court); State v. Fripp, 396 S.C. 434, 441, 721 S.E.2d 465, 468 (Ct.
App. 2012) (concluding the appellant's failure to challenge the circuit court's ruling
in his appellate brief rendered the unchallenged ruling the law of the case); see also

of a violent crime "does not apply in cases where the death penalty or a life
sentence without parole is imposed for the violent crime").
5
Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a
common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent.").
Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not
set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.").

II. Statements to Law Enforcement

Cooper argues the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence his statements to
law enforcement. He contends the statements should have been suppressed because
he invoked his right to counsel and the State failed to show his confession was
knowingly and voluntarily made. We disagree.

We hold the circuit court did not err in admitting Cooper's verbal and written
confession into evidence. See State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306,
313 (2023) ("[T]he question of voluntariness [of a criminal defendant's statement]
presents a mixed question of law and fact."); id. (holding appellate courts "review
the trial court's factual findings regarding voluntariness for any evidentiary
support[,]" but clarifying "the ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those
facts, a statement was voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo
review"). We hold the testimony offered established Cooper was informed of his
rights prior to being questioned and that he understood his rights. See State v.
Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("If a defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the 'burden is on
the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were
voluntarily waived.'" (quoting State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 370 S.E.2d 611
(1988))). Investigators Putney and Morris, who were present at the beginning of
Cooper's interview, both testified Miranda rights were given to Cooper before he
gave his verbal and written statements to police. Further, the circuit court was
presented with Cooper's waiver form and written statement, which Cooper
admitted he signed. Cooper also had some experience with law enforcement in the
past, as evidenced by his testimony admitting he signed a waiver form during an
August 2016 interview regarding a previous arrest. Accordingly, we hold the State
provided evidence Cooper was informed of his rights and understood his rights
prior to giving his statements to law enforcement.
Furthermore, we find the circuit court did not err by concluding Cooper voluntarily
confessed to law enforcement. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 566, 647 S.E.2d
144, 164 (2007) ("In determining whether a confession was given 'voluntarily,' [the
appellate court] must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's giving the confession."); id. ("[T]he totality of the circumstances
includes 'the youth of the accused, his lack of education or his low intelligence, the
lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of
detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of
physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.'" (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973))). As the circuit court stated
in its ruling, Cooper was an adult with one year of college education and prior
criminal history, he was questioned for less than two hours, law enforcement did
not deprive him of anything or subject him to any threats or promises during the
interview, and the interrogation occurred in a routine location for an interview.
Investigators Putney, Morris, and Wade all testified Cooper gave his statements
voluntarily and was not threatened or promised anything during his interview.

Additionally, we hold the law enforcement officers' testimony provided evidence
Cooper made the statement without invoking his right to counsel. See State v.
Wannamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 499, 552 S.E.2d 284, 286 (2001) ("If a suspect
invokes her right to counsel, police interrogation must cease unless the suspect
herself initiates further communication with police. However, police officers are
not required to cease questioning a suspect unless her request for counsel is
unambiguous." (citations omitted)). We acknowledge that Cooper testified he
invoked his right to counsel, but we hold Cooper's testimony that he had no
previous arrest when he had been arrested in the past placed his credibility at issue,
and the circuit court did not err in believing the law enforcement officers'
testimony over Cooper's testimony. See State v. Middleton, 295 S.C. 318, 322, 368
S.E.2d 457, 459 (1988) (finding the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress a
statement and "properly submitted the conflicting evidence on the issue of
voluntariness for the jury's consideration"). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court
did not err in admitting the evidence of Cooper's statement to law enforcement
when the facts presented showed the statements were voluntarily made. Therefore,
we affirm on this issue.
III. Voice Identification
Cooper argues the circuit court erred by permitting Victim to testify she recognized
his voice at the bond hearing as the voice of one of her assailants. He contends the
circuit court erred in admitting the identification evidence because the
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
misidentification because it occurred at his bond hearing.

We hold this issue was not preserved for appellate review because Cooper
acquiesced to the circuit court's ruling regarding the admissibility of the voice
identification. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693–94
(2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]. Issues not raised and ruled upon
in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); State v. Mitchell, 330 S.C.
189, 195, 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998) ("Because counsel acquiesced in the judge's
limitation of his cross-examination, and made no other objections regarding
wanting the criminal files, Appellant cannot now complain about this issue.").
Cooper objected to Victim's voice identification of him, but when the circuit court
stated it believed the identification was admissible pursuant to Rule 901(b)(5),
SCRE, 6 Cooper responded, "All right," and "I think that's exactly what that rule
says." Cooper also agreed Victim could identify him based on his voice if the
State asked if she heard the voice in the courtroom. Cooper made no objection to
Victim's voice identification of him during her testimony before the jury. For these
reasons, we hold Cooper waived this issue and it is therefore not preserved for
appellate review. See Ex parte McMillan, 319 S.C. 331, 335, 461 S.E.2d 43, 45
(1995) (holding an issue procedurally barred when the party conceded the issue at
trial).
CONCLUSION

Based on the forgoing, Cooper's convictions are
AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

6
Rule 901(b)(5), SCRE (providing a voice may be identified "whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion
based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with
the alleged speaker").