Ronald Barfield v. Nilesh Patel

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ronald Edwin Barfield, Plaintiff,

v.

The Corner Store, Inc., and all persons claiming any
right, title, estate interest in or lien upon the real estate
described; any unknown adults and those persons who
may be in the military service of the United States of
America, all of them being a class designated as John
Doe, whose true name is unknown; any unborn infants or
persons under disability being a class designated as
Richard Roe, whose true name is unknown, United States
of America, and Paige Holsapple as Florence County
Delinquent Tax Collector, Defendants,

Of Whom Ronald Edwin Barfield, The Corner Store,
Inc., and all persons claiming any right, title, estate
interest in or lien upon the real estate described; any
unknown adults and those persons who may be in the
military service of the United States of America, all of
them being a class designated as John Doe, whose true
name is unknown; any unborn infants or persons under
disability being a class designated as Richard Roe, whose
true name is unknown, United States of America, and
Paige Holsapple as Florence County Delinquent Tax
Collector are the Respondents,

And

Nilesh Patel, as Trustee of Anjay R. Patel Irrevocable
Trust Agreement Dated December 18, 2000, is the
Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2021-001185

Appeal From Florence County
W. Haigh Porter, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-208
Submitted May 1, 2024 – Filed June 5, 2024

AFFIRMED

Jennifer Dowd Nichols, of Newberry, for Appellant.

Charlie James Blake, Jr., of Florence, for Respondent
Ronald Edwin Barfield.

D. Malloy McEachin, Jr., of McEachin & McEachin,
P.A., of Florence, for Respondent Paige Holsapple.

Michele Dahl Sturkie, of Sturkie Law, LLC, of Florence,
for Respondent The Corner Store, Inc.

George John Conits, of Greenville, for Respondent
United States of America.

PER CURIAM: Nilesh Patel, as Trustee of the Anjay R. Patel Irrevocable Trust
Agreement Dated December 18, 2000 (Patel), appeals the master-in-equity's order
quieting title to the subject real property in Ronald Barfield. On appeal, Patel
argues the master-in-equity erred in: failing to find the federal forfeiture of the
subject property should have prevented the tax sale; failing to find the federal
government's release of the property from the forfeiture years after the tax sale did
not cure the defect of selling the property while under federal forfeiture; failing to
find the tax sale was invalid because Florence County (the County) failed to
comply with notice requirements; and applying the statute of limitations in section
12-51-160 of the South Carolina Code (2014) to bar his claim. We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the master-in-equity did not err when he found the federal forfeiture of
the subject property did not render the tax sale invalid. See Folk v. Thomas, 344
S.C. 77, 80, 543 S.E.2d 556, 557 (2001) ("An action to set aside a tax deed is in
equity."); id. ("Therefore, [an appellate c]ourt may take its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence."); Smith v. Barr, 375 S.C. 157, 160, 650 S.E.2d
486, 488 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]his scope of review does not require us to disregard
the [m]aster's factual findings because the [m]aster saw and heard witnesses and
was in a better position to judge their credibility and demeanor."). Although we
agree the County should not have sold the property at a tax sale while it was under
federal forfeiture, the United States subsequently withdrew its claim to the
property and waived any objection to the tax sale. The United States gained clear
title via the forfeiture; accordingly, it is the only entity that could object to the sale
on the basis of the prior forfeiture, which it declined to do. See Federal Food and
Drugs Act of 1906, 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) ("All right, title, and interest in [the]
property . . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise
to forfeiture under this section."); id. (explaining forfeited property "that is
subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant" may still be
"forfeited to the United States"); § 853(k)(2) ("[N]o party claiming an interest in
property subject to forfeiture . . . may . . . commence an action at law or equity
against the United States concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the
property subsequent to the filing of an indictment . . . alleging that the property is
subject to forfeiture under this section."); Townsend v. Townsend, 323 S.C. 309,
314, 474 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1996) ("To have standing, one must have a personal
stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit; i.e., one must be the 'real party in
interest.'" (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C. 454, 458, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1994))); id. ("A real party in interest is one who 'has a real, actual, material or
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as distinguished from one
who has only a nominal, formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the
action.'" (quoting Bailey, 312 S.C. at 458, 441 S.E.2d at 327)).

2. We hold the master-in-equity did not err in finding the tax sale valid because
the County appropriately phrased the sale notice and sent the notice to the proper
entities in strict compliance with South Carolina law. The notice given by the
County stated that if taxes were not paid before October 3, 2016, the property
would be advertised and sold; this notice complied with statutory requirements
because October 3, 2016, was not an arbitrary date, but rather the actual date of the
tax sale. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-40(b) (2014) (explaining that if taxes "are
not paid before a subsequent sales date, the property must be duly advertised and
sold" (emphasis added)); Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, Inc., 353 S.C. 31, 38, 577
S.E.2d 202, 206 (2003) (explaining "the statute does not provide that the [c]ounty
set a date, other than the sales date, after which the taxpayer can no longer pay his
delinquent taxes" (emphasis added)). Although Patel argues the County should
have allowed payment on the date of the sale, the plain language of the statute does
not mandate it. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581
(2000) ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and
the court has no right to impose another meaning."). Additionally, contrary to
Patel's assertions that the County should not have mailed additional notices to the
registered agent of the owner, we find the County strictly complied with statutory
requirements when it mailed a notice to The Corner Store, Inc., the delinquent
taxpayer of record, and the County's sending of additional notices out of courtesy
did not nullify its compliance with the statute, which neither required nor
prohibited additional notices. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-120 (2014) ("[T]he
person officially charged with the collection of delinquent taxes shall mail a
notice . . . to the defaulting taxpayer and to a grantee, or lessee of the property of
record in the appropriate public records of the county."). Moreover, the fact the
notice sent to The Corner Store Inc. was returned as undelivered did not render the
tax sale defective. See id. ("[T]he return of the certified mail 'undelivered' is not
grounds for a tax title to be withheld or be found defective and ordered set aside or
canceled of record."). Finally, Patel was not entitled to receive notice of the right
to redemption because he was not the defaulting taxpayer, grantee, or lessee of the
property and possessed only an assignment of rents and leases as the lessor. See id.
("[T]he person officially charged with the collection of delinquent taxes shall mail
a notice . . . to the defaulting taxpayer and to a grantee, mortgagee, or lessee of the
property of record in the appropriate public records of the county." (emphasis
added)); Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581 ("Where the statute's language
is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of
statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another
meaning.").

3. Initially, we hold Patel did not have the requisite standing to challenge the tax
sale because the statutory right to redemption is given to the "defaulting taxpayer,
any grantee from the owner, or any mortgage or judgment creditor," and Patel
possessed only an assignment of rents and leases. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-51-90(A) (2014) ("The defaulting taxpayer, any grantee from the owner, or
any mortgage or judgment creditor may within twelve months from the date of the
delinquent tax sale redeem each item of real estate by paying to the person
officially charged with the collection of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties,
and costs . . . ."). Nevertheless, even if Patel could challenge the tax sale on this
basis, the statute of limitations applies because, as discussed above, there was no
jurisdictional defect with the sale, as Patel was not entitled to notice and the
County strictly complied with the statutory requirements. See Fed. Fin. Co. v.
Hartley, 380 S.C. 65, 68, 668 S.E.2d 410, 412 (2008) ("The two year limitation in
this statute is the period in which an owner who lost title to the property through a
tax sale may bring an action to recover that property."); Forfeited Land Comm'n of
Bamberg Cnty. v. Beard, 424 S.C. 137, 146, 817 S.E.2d 801, 805 (Ct. App. 2018)
(explaining a defect in a tax sale is jurisdictional when the "tax sale is not held in
strict compliance with the statute"). Therefore, Patel would have been required to
commence his action within two years of the tax sale. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-51-160 (2014) ("An action for the recovery of land sold pursuant to this
chapter or for the recovery of the possession must not be maintained unless
brought within two years from the date of the sale as provided in [s]ection
12-51-90(C) [of the South Carolina Code (2014)]."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-51-90(C) (2014) ("If the defaulting taxpayer, grantee from the owner, or
mortgage or judgment creditor fails to redeem the item of real estate sold at the
delinquent tax sale within the twelve months . . . and after the passing of an
additional twelve months, the tax deed issued is incontestable on procedural or
other grounds.").

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.