State v. Maxie P. Wagner

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Maxie Paul Wagner, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000658

Appeal From Lexington County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-069
Submitted February 1, 2024 – Filed March 6, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III,
of Lexington, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Maxie Paul Wagner appeals his convictions for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine and trafficking cocaine, 28 to 100 grams,
along with his concurrent sentences of twelve years' imprisonment for each
conviction. On appeal, Wagner argues the trial court erred when it denied his
pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wagner's request to
suppress evidence because we find the officer's knowledge of Wagner's violation
of section 56-10-240(B) of the South Carolina Code (2018) was not stale. See
State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases,
the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Missouri, 361 S.C.
107, 111, 603 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2004) ("When reviewing a Fourth Amendment
search and seizure case, an appellate court must affirm the trial [court's] ruling if
there is any evidence to support the ruling."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-240(A)
(2018) (stating that if "a motor vehicle is or becomes an uninsured motor vehicle,
then the vehicle owner immediately shall obtain insurance on the vehicle or within
five days after the effective date of cancellation or expiration of his liability
insurance policy"); State v. Woodruff, 344 S.C. 537, 546, 544 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Ct.
App. 2001) ("A police officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for
investigative purposes . . . when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts . . . that the person is involved in criminal activity."); State v.
Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 108, 747 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013) ("Violation of motor
vehicle codes provides an officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.").
The officer testified he learned of the traffic violation from another officer and,
based on that information, initiated the traffic stop on Wagner twelve days later.
This court and our supreme court have considered, and rejected, staleness
arguments in the context of evidence used to support probable cause for a search
warrant. See State v. Simmons, 430 S.C. 1, 13-14, 841 S.E.2d 841, 851 (2020)
(finding seven-month-old information was sufficient to provide probable cause for
a search warrant); State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 550-51, 426 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ct.
App. 1992) (finding a lapse of sixty days sufficed for probable cause in the search
warrant). Because the reasonable suspicion required for a traffic stop is a less
rigorous standard than probable cause, and because the time lapse at issue here was
only twelve days, we similarly reject Wagner's staleness claim. We further hold
that even if the suspension was temporary and the suspension could have been
remedied under the statute, Wagner did not cure the violation and failed to provide
any evidence that the matter could have been fully resolved within the twelve-day
period. See § 56-10-240(B) (failing to provide a specific time frame for which a
suspended license plate may be reinstated unless the vehicle was "actually insured"
and the Department of Motor Vehicles issued the suspension in error).
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in finding the information was not
stale; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., KONDUROS, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.