State v. Darryl D. Bradley, Jr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Darryl Douglas Bradley, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000524

Appeal From Beaufort County
Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-031
Submitted September 1, 2023 – Filed January 24, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia, and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Darryl D. Bradley, Jr. appeals his convictions for attempted
armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime and his aggregate sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal,
Bradley argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial (1) when an
investigator for the State testified she was "familiar" with Bradley and (2) after the
trial court instructed the jury to find a "just result" in this case. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2020, a Beaufort County grand jury indicted Bradley for first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, attempted armed robbery, kidnapping, and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At trial, Victim
testified she was sixty-five years old, lived with her parents on St. Helena Island,
and cared for her mother, who had dementia. Victim stated that on April 18,
2017, she was home when Bradley rang her doorbell and asked if she had any yard
work for him to do. According to Victim, she informed Bradley that she did not
and went to close the door; however, Bradley pushed past her and demanded
money. She recounted how Bradley put a gun to her head, pulled her to the back of
the house, and assaulted her.

Victim testified that after the assault, Bradley dragged her through the house and
again demanded money. Victim stated she informed Bradley that her "folks are
retired [and] they don't have any money." She testified Bradley got frustrated and
ran out the door. Victim recalled that after Bradley left, she called her sister and
provided law enforcement with Bradley's description.

Investigator Jennifer Snider, with the Beaufort County Sheriff's Office (BCSO),
testified she showed Victim a photo lineup and Victim selected Bradley's photo as
the individual who assaulted her. The State attempted to clarify with Snider the
identity of the person Victim chose from the lineup and asked, "[l]aw enforcement
identified that as Mr. Bradley?" Snider responded affirmatively and stated, "I was
familiar with Mr. Bradley, so I knew that was Mr. Bradley."

Bradley objected to Snider's comment. The trial court sent the jury out and
Bradley moved for a mistrial. He argued that because Snider was a law
enforcement officer, her comment "cast him in a light that is terribly unfavorable,
prejudicial, [and] can't be cured by some instruction to the jury." The trial court
denied Bradley's motion, stating that Snider could have known Bradley "from all
sorts of circumstances," other than her duties as a law enforcement officer. The
trial court noted, with agreement from Bradley, that Snider's comment was not
solicited by the State. The trial court found the comment did not rise "to the level
of legal prejudice necessary to declare a mistrial."
Investigator Jason Malphrus, also with the BCSO, testified that after arriving at
Victim's house on the day of the assault, he interviewed Victim's neighbors.
Malphrus recalled he asked her neighbors if they knew a "young male, [that] may
walk around and ask for money or ask to do yard work from time to time." He
stated Bradley came up as a suspect during these interviews, and he created a photo
lineup that included Bradley's picture. Malphrus testified he showed the lineup to
Victim's father. According to Malphrus, Victim's father selected Bradley's photo
and indicated Bradley had previously done yard work at his house.

Timothy French, also with the BCSO, stated he tested the clothing Victim wore the
day of the assault for the presence of any male DNA. According to French, a
semen stain on Victim's skirt contained DNA that matched Bradley's.

The State also introduced a recording of a jail phone call Bradley made to his
sister. During the recording, Bradley admitted to his sister that he took Victim's
phone but the police had not found it. Additionally, Bradley stated in the
recording "yeah I did it, no need to lie" and confirmed to his sister that he broke
into Victim's house after she asked, "you did break into their house?"

Bradley testified in his own defense and stated he had done yard work for Victim
and her father on multiple occasions and he had been inside of their home
"numerous times." According to Bradley, Victim called him on April 18, 2017,
and told him to come over to pick up the rest of the money she owed him for
"sweeping off her drive-through." He testified that when he arrived at the house,
Victim let him inside, gave him some food, and asked him to have sex. He
claimed Victim led him to the back bedroom, where he set his gun on the dresser.
Bradley stated that Victim changed her mind about having sex, due to the presence
of the gun, and told him to leave. He acknowledged that he then demanded money
from Victim and looked through her father's possessions for any cash. Bradley
recalled Victim became scared and started to pray. He testified that he found no
money and left the house after Victim threatened to call the police. H e asserted
he was not guilty of burglary because he had Victim's consent to enter the house.

The trial court instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the State's burden of
proof. The trial court also reiterated the State's burden of proof during its
instructions on the elements of each of the charges against Bradley. At the end of
the trial court's charge, it stated that it charged the jury on the law "in order to help
guide [them] to a just result in this case." Bradley objected to the trial court's jury
charge and moved for a mistrial arguing the "just result" language used by the
trial court lessened the State's burden of proof. The trial court denied Bradley's
motion and did not give a curative instruction.

The jury found Bradley guilty of attempted armed robbery and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced
Bradley to concurrent terms of twenty years' imprisonment for attempted armed
robbery and five years' imprisonment for possession of a weapon. This appeal
followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court err in refusing to declare a mistrial following Snider's
testimony?

II. Did the trial court err in refusing to declare a mistrial following the jury
instructions?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v.
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). The reviewing court "is
bound by the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Snider's Comment

Bradley argues the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial because
Snider's comment improperly implied to the jury that Bradley had been involved in
prior criminal acts. We disagree.

"The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court." State v. Harris, 382 S.C. 107, 117, 674 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ct. App. 2009).
"The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion amounting to an error of law." Id. "A mistrial should only be granted
when absolutely necessary, and a defendant must show both error and resulting
prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial." Id. "The granting of a motion for a
mistrial is an extreme measure that should only be taken if an incident is so
grievous that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way." Id.

In State v. Moultrie, Moultrie was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute. 316 S.C. 547, 549, 451 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1994). At trial, the
arresting officer testified he knew Moultrie by "sight and name." Id. at 556, 451
S.E.2d at 40. Moultrie moved for a mistrial and argued the officer's testimony
improperly portrayed him "as a person who had been the subject of police
investigation in the past." Id. While this court determined the issue was not
preserved for appellate review, it stated that "the challenged testimony was still
admissible because it did not prejudice Moultrie." Id. "A trial court error must
sufficiently prejudice the defendant in order to require reversal." Id. The court
noted "[o]ther evidence far more damaging to Moultrie than [the arresting officer]'s
casual statement that he knew Moultrie 'by sight and name' haunts the record." Id.

Similarly, in State v. Thompson, this court held that an officer's "single reference to
warrants that existed against Thompson did not constitute sufficient prejudice to
justify a mistrial." 352 S.C. 552, 561, 575 S.E.2d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2003).
"[T]here [was] no indication from [the officer]'s testimony that the warrants
referred to unrelated charges or other bad acts committed by Thompson." Id.
Additionally, "the jury heard testimony that a BOLO had been issued against
Thompson . . . [t]hus, it would be reasonable to assume the jury inferred that the
warrants related to the charged offenses." Id.

"Generally, appellate courts will not set aside convictions due to insubstantial
errors not affecting the result." State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 212, 631 S.E.2d 262,
267 (2006). "Error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. "Thus, an insubstantial error not affecting
the result of the trial is harmless where 'guilt has been conclusively proven by
competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be reached.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989)).

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley's motion for a
mistrial. During Snider's testimony, she commented she "was familiar with Mr.
Bradley, so [she] knew [it] was Mr. Bradley" who Victim identified from the photo
lineup. Snider's comment was not improper. The comment did not explicitly
implicate Bradley in a previous crime or portray him in a negative light because
Snider did not state she knew Bradley from a prior bad act. Additionally, the jury
could have inferred that Snider knew Bradley from working on this investigation
or from circumstances apart from her duties as an officer. Furthermore, as
conceded by Bradley, her comment was unsolicited by the State because the State's
questioning was aimed at clarifying who Victim identified in the photo lineup.
See Thompson, 352 S.C. at 561, 575 S.E.2d at 82 (holding an officer's "single
reference to warrants that existed [against the defendant] did not constitute
sufficient prejudice to justify a mistrial" when there was no indication the warrants
referred to unrelated charges or other prior bad acts and the jury heard testimony
regarding an advisory to be on the lookout for the defendant).

However, even assuming Snider's comment was improper, Bradley was not
prejudiced because the State introduced evidence that was far more damaging and
his guilt was conclusively proven. At trial, the State presented testimony of a
photo lineup identification of Bradley by Victim, testimony of a separate
identification by Victim's father that Bradley had asked for yard work previously,
the presence of Bradley's semen and DNA on Victim's clothing, and a jail call
recording in which Bradley appeared to admit to breaking into Victim's house.
Further, Bradley testified he demanded money from Victim and rifled through the
house. We find Bradley suffered no prejudice from Snider's comment and any
error was harmless. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Bradley's motion for a mistrial. See Moultrie, 316 S.C. at 549, 451
S.E.2d at 36 ("A trial court error must sufficiently prejudice the defendant in order
to require reversal."); id. (holding the arresting officer's comment that he knew
Moultrie by sight and name "admissible because it did not prejudice Moultrie . . .
[and o]ther evidence far more damaging to Moultrie than [the arresting officer]'s
casual statement . . . haunts the record"); Pagan, 369 S.C. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at
267 ("Generally, appellate courts will not set aside convictions due to insubstantial
errors not affecting the result."); id. ("[A]n insubstantial error not affecting the
result of the trial is harmless where 'guilt has been conclusively proven by
competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be reached.'"
(quoting Bailey, 298 S.C. at 5, 377 S.E.2d at 584)).

II. Jury Instructions

Bradley argues the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial after it
instructed the jury to find a "just result." We disagree.

"The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure that should only be
taken if an incident is so grievous that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no
other way." Harris, 382 S.C. at 117, 674 S.E.2d at 537. "In reviewing jury
charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of
the evidence and issues presented at trial." State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577
S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003). "If, as a whole, the charges are reasonably free
from error, isolated portions which might be misleading do not constitute
reversible error." Id. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 463–64. "A jury charge which is
substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal." Id. at 319, 577
S.E.2d at 464. "[A] trial [court] should refrain from informing the jury, whether
through comments or through a charge on the law, that its role is to search for the
truth, or to find the true facts, or to render a just verdict." State v. Beaty, 423 S.C.
26, 34, 813 S.E.2d 502, 506 (2018). "These phrases could be understood to place
an obligation on the jury, independent of the burden of proof, to determine the
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime and from those facts alone render the
verdict the jury believes best serves its perception of justice." Id.

In State v. Aleksey, the trial court instructed the jury that its job was to "seek the
truth." 343 S.C. 20, 26, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2000). Our supreme court
observed, "the 'seek' language here did not appear in either the reasonable doubt or
circumstantial evidence charges, but in the instructions on juror credibility." Id. at
27, 538 S.E.2d at 251–52. Our supreme court did not reverse the defendant's
conviction and held the improper "remarks were prefaced by a full instruction on
reasonable doubt and followed by an additional exhortation to bear in mind the
State's heavy burden of proof." Id. at 29, 538 S.E.2d at 253. The court
determined "the instruction as a whole properly conveyed the law to the jury and
there [was] not a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction
in a manner inconsistent with the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at 29, 538 S.E.2d at 253.

Similarly, in State v. Needs, our supreme court held "the trial [court]'s
circumstantial evidence charge was erroneous because it instructed jurors to seek a
reasonable explanation other than the guilt of the accused." 333 S.C. 134, 154,
508 S.E.2d 857, 867 (1998). Nonetheless, the court concluded the improper
instruction "was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial judge
instructed jurors twenty-six other times throughout his charge that the State has the
burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley's motion for a
mistrial. Although the trial court improperly instructed the jury, "I have now
charged you on the law in order to help guide you to a just result in this case," we
find any error was harmless. See Beaty, 423 S.C. at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 506 ("[A]
trial [court] should refrain from informing the jury, whether through comments or
through a charge on the law, that its role is to search for the truth, or to find the true
facts, or to render a just verdict."); id. ("These phrases could be understood to place
an obligation on the jury, independent of the burden of proof, to determine the
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime and from those facts alone render the
verdict the jury believes best serves its perception of justice."); Harris, 382 S.C. at
117, 674 S.E.2d at 537 ("The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme
measure that should only be taken if an incident is so grievous that the prejudicial
effect can be removed in no other way."). Bradley was not prejudiced by the
instruction because although the comment was at the very end of the charge, it did
not occur during the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction and it was preceded
by instructions on reasonable doubt and the State's burden of proof. See Aleksey,
343 S.C. at 27, 538 S.E.2d at 251–52 (observing that "the 'seek' language in that
case did not appear in either the reasonable doubt or circumstantial evidence
charges, but in the instructions on juror credibility"); id. at 29, 538 S.E.2d at 253
(holding the trial court's improper "remarks were prefaced by a full instruction on
reasonable doubt and followed by an additional exhortation to bear in mind the
State's heavy burden of proof"). The trial court further emphasized the State's
burden of proof throughout its charge when it instructed the jury on the elements of
each indicted crime. See Needs, 333 S.C. at 154, 508 S.E.2d at 867 ("[T]he trial
[court]'s circumstantial evidence charge was erroneous because it instructed jurors
to seek a reasonable explanation other than the guilt of the accused."); id.
("However, we conclude it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because
the trial judge instructed jurors twenty-six other times throughout his charge that
the State has the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."); Aleksey, 343 S.C. at 28-29, 538 S.E.2d at 252 (holding "the instruction as
a whole properly conveyed the law to the jury and there [was] not a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a manner inconsistent with
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt").

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Bradley's convictions are

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.