State v. Linda L. Monette

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Linda Lyn Monette, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001276

Appeal From Lexington County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-032
Submitted January 1, 2024 – Filed January 31, 2024

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
and Assistant Attorney General Tommy Evans, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of
Lexington, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Linda Lyn Monette appeals her convictions for murder,
attempted armed robbery, conspiracy, and first-degree burglary, and her aggregate
sentence of forty years' imprisonment. Monette argues the trial court erred by
admitting a statement she gave to law enforcement during custodial interrogation
because the statement was the product of coercion. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not err by admitting the statement because it was given
freely and voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. See State v. Miller, 441
S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[W]e . . . review the trial court's
factual findings regarding voluntariness for any evidentiary support. However, the
ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those facts, a statement was
voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review."). Although the
detectives admitted to raising their voices and urging Monette to tell the truth, she
requested the interview, which lasted approximately two hours; the officers
testified they advised her of her Miranda1 rights immediately prior to her giving
the statement, and she voluntarily waived them; she was a twenty-three-year-old
high school graduate; officers supplied her food during the interview; she began
her statement without input from law enforcement; she was not threatened or
promised anything in exchange for the statement; and she indicated she felt relief
after giving her statement. Accordingly, we find Monette gave this statement
voluntarily and not through intimidation, coercion, or deception, and that it was
made with awareness of the nature and consequences of her decision. See State v.
Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("If a defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the 'burden is on
the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were
voluntarily waived.'" (quoting State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 55, 370 S.E.2d
611, 612 (1988))); State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 513, 702 S.E.2d 395, 401 (Ct.
App. 2010) (stating a waiver of Miranda rights requires "(1) the waiver must be
'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception' and (2) the waiver must be 'made with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it'" (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560
U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010))); Saltz, 346 S.C. at 136, 551 S.E.2d at 252 ("The trial
[court]'s determination of the voluntariness of a statement must be made on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444,
452 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]ppropriate factors to consider in the
totality-of-circumstances analysis include: background, experience, and conduct of

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
the accused; age; length of custody; police misrepresentations; isolation of a minor
from his or her parent; threats of violence; and promises of leniency.").

AFFIRMED. 2

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.