Hannah Guenther v. Roman Guenther

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Hannah Guenther, Respondent,

v.

Roman Guenther, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001373

Appeal From Charleston County
Spiros S. Ferderigos, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-304
Submitted June 1, 2023 – Filed August 30, 2023

AFFIRMED

Megan Catherine Hunt Dell, of Dell Family Law, P.C., of
Charleston, for Appellant.

Hannah Guenther, of Charleston, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Roman Guenther (Husband) appeals the family court's order
granting his wife, Hannah Guenther (Wife), an order of protection against him
pursuant to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act (the Act). 1 Husband argues
the family court erred by (1) failing to require Wife to present clear and convincing

1
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-10 to -160 (2014 & Supp. 2022).
evidence supporting the issuance of an order of protection because the order
implicated his due process rights, and (2) granting the order of protection when
Wife failed to prove her entitlement to it. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. We hold Husband's argument that the order of protection implicated his due
process rights—and therefore the family court should have required Wife to meet a
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof to establish her entitlement to the
order—is not preserved for appellate review because he did not raise the argument
to the family court. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731,
733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be
preserved for appellate review."); Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 625, 576 S.E.2d
156, 163 (2003) ("A due process claim raised for the first time on appeal is not
preserved.").

2. We hold the family court did not err in issuing the order of protection because
Wife established she was entitled to an order of protection against Husband by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709
S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews
factual and legal issues de novo."); Ashburn v. Rogers, 420 S.C. 411, 416, 803
S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ct. App. 2017) ("Consistent with this de novo review, the
appellant retains the burden to show that the family court's findings are not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be
affirmed."); § 20-4-20(f) ("'Order of protection' means an order of protection
issued to protect the petitioner . . . from the abuse of another household member
whe[n] the respondent has received notice of the proceedings and has had an
opportunity to be heard."); § 20-4-20(a)(1) (defining "abuse" as "physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or the threat of physical harm"); § 20-4-40(b) ("A petition
for relief . . . must state the specific time, place, details of the abuse, and other facts
and circumstances upon which relief is sought and must be verified.").

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.