Olivia M. Thompson v. College of Charleston

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Olivia M. Thompson, Ph.D., M.P.H, Appellant,

v.

College of Charleston; College of Charleston Foundation,
Inc.; Frances C. Welch, Ph.D., M.A.; Godfrey A.
Gibbison, Ph.D., M.S.; and Christopher R. Tobin,
Defendants,

Of Whom College of Charleston and Frances C. Welch,
Ph.D., M.A. are Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000044

Appeal From Charleston County
Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-301
Submitted June 1, 2023 – Filed August 30, 2023

AFFIRMED

Daniel Francis Blanchard, III, of Rosen Hagood LLC, of
Charleston, for Appellant.

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr.; Randell Croft Stoney, Jr.; John
William Fletcher; and Allison Marie Burns; all of
Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Olivia M. Thompson appeals the circuit court's denial of her
motions for preliminary injunctive relief. On appeal, Thompson argues the circuit
court abused its discretion in (1) finding a prior Form 4 order issued by another
judge was binding on the matters raised in her subsequent motions; (2) finding she
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a likelihood of success, and an inadequate
remedy at law; and (3) relying on facts that were not included in the record. We
affirm.

1. We hold the circuit court abused its discretion in finding a prior Form 4 order
denying Thompson's first motion for preliminary injunction decided the merits of
her second and third motions for preliminary injunction. See Strategic Res. Co. v.
BCS Life Ins. Co., 367 S.C. 540, 544, 627 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2006) ("An order
granting or denying an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion."); id. ("An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is unsupported by the
evidence or controlled by an error of law."). Because an order denying a motion
for preliminary injunction is interlocutory, the prior Form 4 order did not preclude
Thompson from filing a subsequent motion for an injunction and did not decide the
merits of her second and third motions. See Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of
Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("[A]n interlocutory order
which merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the cause,
collateral to the issues in the case, is not binding as the law of the case, and may be
reconsidered and corrected by the court before entering a final order on the merits."
(quoting Weil v. Weil, 299 S.C. 84, 89, 382 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Ct. App. 1989))); S.C.
Pub. Int. Found. v. Wilson, 437 S.C. 334, 341, 878 S.E.2d 891, 895 (2022) ("[A]n
order denying a motion for preliminary injunction is interlocutory . . . .").
However, we hold the circuit court's error was harmless because Thompson's
second and third motions did not satisfy the requirements for injunctive relief. See
Sparks v. McCraw 112 S.C. 519, 527, 100 S.E. 161, 163 (1919) (holding a finding
in the circuit court's order was unsupported by the record; however, this error was
"immaterial" because even if the finding was incorrect, "it would not affect the
result").

2. We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Thompson
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a likelihood of success, and an inadequate
remedy at law. See Strategic Res. Co., 367 S.C. at 544, 627 S.E.2d at 689 ("An
order granting or denying an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.");
Scratch Golf Co. v. Dunes W. Residential Golf Props., Inc., 361 S.C. 117, 121, 603
S.E.2d 905, 907 (2004) ("An injunction is a drastic remedy issued by the court in
its discretion to prevent irreparable harm suffered by the plaintiff."); id. at 121, 603
S.E.2d at 908 ("For a preliminary injunction to be granted, the plaintiff must
establish that (1) it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted[;]
(2) it will likely succeed on the merits of the litigation; and (3) there is an
inadequate remedy at law."); Peek v. Spartanburg Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 367 S.C.
450, 455, 626 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Whether 'a wrong is irreparable, in
the sense that equity may intervene, and whether there is an adequate remedy at
law, are questions that are not decided by narrow and artificial rules.'" (quoting
Kirk v. Clark, 191 S.C. 205, 211, 4 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1939))); id. at 455, 626 S.E.2d at
37 ("The complete loss of a professional practice can be an irreparable harm.");
Levine v. Spartanburg Reg'l Servs. Dist., Inc., 367 S.C. 458, 465, 626 S.E.2d 38,
41-42 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, would suffer
irreparable harm and the loss of her professional practice because she would lose
her entire patient referral base and competency in anesthesiology had she not
received a preliminary injunction permitting her to work for the defendant, a
hospital). Thompson failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and an inadequate
remedy at law because she is not at risk of a complete loss of her professional
practice, and the injuries she alleged can be remedied by monetary damages or an
order of the circuit court.

Additionally, Thompson failed to demonstrate that she would succeed on the
merits because she has not provided any evidence a Memorandum of
Understanding (the MOU) between herself and Respondents was an enforceable
contract. See id. at 465, 626 S.E.2d at 42 ("When seeking a preliminary injunction,
the plaintiff need not prove an absolute legal right; the plaintiff need only present 'a
fair question to raise as to the existence of such a right.'" (quoting Williams v.
Jones, 92 S.C. 342, 347, 75 S.E. 705, 710 (1912))); Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C.,
Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 568, 578, 762 S.E.2d 696, 701 (2014) ("[F]or a
contract to be binding, material terms cannot be left for future agreement."); Alala
v. Peachtree Plantations, Inc., 292 S.C. 160, 167, 355 S.E.2d 286, 290 (Ct. App.
1987) ("[A]ll parties must be obligated under a contract in order for it to be
enforceable."); Atl. Joint Stock Land Bank of Raleigh v. Latta, 164 S.C. 56, 60, 162
S.E. 68, 69 (1932) ("It is elementary that the consideration for a contract cannot
consist of the doing of an act which the moving party was in any event required to
do as a matter of law or existing contract.").

3. Thompson argues the circuit court abused its discretion by finding (1) she
taught three courses "which are placed with[in] similar disciplines," (2) her course
load was "typical for a faculty member in her Department," (3) the location of her
office "is reasonable and consistent with this academic setting," (4) "she ha[d]
presented no evidence to show that she should have obtained [the chairperson]
position," and (5) the MOU's "terms do not evidence an intent to be contractually
bound." We hold the circuit court abused its discretion in making the first three
findings because the record does not contain evidence that directly supports them;
however, the errors were harmless because Thompson failed to satisfy the
prerequisites for a preliminary injunction. See Sparks, 112 S.C. at 527, 100 S.E. at
163 (holding a finding in the circuit court's order was unsupported by the record;
however, this error was "immaterial" because even if the finding was incorrect, "it
would not affect the result"). Finally, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in making the fourth and fifth findings because they are supported by
evidence in the record. See Bankers Tr. of S.C. v. Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 418, 323
S.E.2d 523, 529 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding the signing of an order by a judge
"prepared in its entirety" by a party to the case is not condoned; however, "the
findings in the order, though not the product of the trial judge's mind, are formally
his"); id. ("Such orders and the findings therein are not to be rejected out-of-hand;
they will stand if supported by the evidence.").

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.