State v. Steadman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

David Lance Steadman, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000336

Appeal From Lexington County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-144
Submitted March 1, 2023 – Filed April 5, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia, and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III of
Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: David Lance Steadman appeals his conviction for homicide by
child abuse and sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Steadman
argues the trial court erroneously denied his motions for a mistrial after (1) a
witness testified regarding the victim's brittle bones and previous leg breaks, which
the trial court held was inadmissible in a pretrial hearing and (2) the State, during
its closing argument, told the jury it had a "noble opportunity" to "strike back
against injustice." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Steadman's mistrial
motion following testimony regarding the victim's prior medical history. See State
v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 63, 530 S.E.2d 626, 627-28 (2000) ("The granting or
refusing of a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion
amounting to an error of law."). The State did not elicit the testimony as a prior
bad act, it was limited to a brief reference by a single witness, and the trial court
immediately instructed the jury to disregard the testimony as not relevant to the
case at hand. See State v. Kirby, 269 S.C. 25, 28, 236 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1977) ("The
power of a court to declare a mistrial ought to be used with the greatest caution
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."); State v.
Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 34, 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A mistrial should
only be granted when 'absolutely necessary,' and a defendant must show both error
and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial." (quoting Harris, 340
S.C. at 63, 530 S.E.2d at 628)).

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Steadman's motion for a
mistrial following the State's comments in its closing argument. See State v.
Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 605, 683 S.E.2d 500, 509 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A trial court
is allowed broad discretion in dealing with the range and propriety of closing
argument to the jury."). Initially, we find the State's closing argument was within
its accepted purview to appeal to the jury's duty to return a just verdict. See State
v. Rice, 375 S.C. 302, 336, 652 S.E.2d 409, 426 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding a
prosecutor's statement to the jury to give the victim's wife peace and the victim
justice could be viewed as consistent with the prosecutor's duty not merely to
convict the defendant, but "to see justice done"), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Byers 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Moreover, any impropriety in
the State's remarks did not prejudice Steadman. See State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20,
26-29, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251-53 (2000) (holding the trial court's instructions to the
jury that it had "one single objective and that [was] to seek the truth" in the context
of the court's instructions as a whole, which included full instructions regarding
reasonable doubt, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights); State v.
Daniels, 401 S.C. 251, 257, 260, 737 S.E.2d 473, 476-77 (2012) (Toal, C.J.,
concurring) (finding the trial court stating "[t]his court is of the confirmed opinion
that whatever verdict you reach will represent truth and justice for all parties that
are involved in this case" was improper, but not prejudicial because the instructions
as a whole properly conveyed the reasonable doubt standard). Moreover, the trial
court instructed the jury that emotional appeals were simply advocacy and the jury
should "consider the facts that have been presented." See Von Dohlen v. State, 360
S.C. 598, 609, 602 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2004) ("A review of a solicitor's closing
argument is based upon the standard of whether his comments so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.");
Fortune v. State, 428 S.C. 545, 549, 837 S.E.2d 37, 39 (2019) ("To find whether
the assistant solicitor's comments in closing argument violated the defendant's due
process rights, we must determine whether the comments were improper, and if so,
whether the improper argument so unfairly prejudiced the defendant as to deny
him a fair trial.").

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.