Larry Bright v. Heather Davis

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Joni B. Wortkoetter, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Larry Bright, Appellant,

v.

Heather D. Davis and MidFirst Bank, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000516

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Gordon G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-053
Submitted January 1, 2023 – Filed February 8, 2023

REVERSED

Richard H. Rhodes and William Hardwick Rhodes, both
of Burts Turner & Rhodes, of Spartanburg; and Ronald
G. Bruce, of Greer, all for Appellant.

Daniel Roper Hughes and J. Alexander Zimmerman, both
of Duggan & Hughes, LLC, of Greer, for Respondent
Heather D. Davis.

Magalie A. Creech, of Charleston, for Respondent
MidFirst Bank.
PER CURIAM: Joni B. Wortkoetter, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Larry Bright (Appellant), appeals the master-in-equity's (the master's) order
granting Heather Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal,
Appellant argues the master erred in granting Davis's motion because (1) the facts
surrounding the case were not before the court; (2) the circuit court, simultaneously
with referring the case to the master, ruled that the motion would be deferred until
discovery could be completed; (3) the master did not view the pleadings in a light
most favorable to Bright; (4) the master did not view the facts in a light most
favorable to Bright; (5) the facts of the case, as shown in the Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion, demonstrate that judgment on the pleadings should not have been granted;
and (6) the unrefuted affidavits and documents filed by Bright showed that
reformation of the deed should have been granted. Appellant also asserts the
master erred in holding section 15-3-340 of the South Carolina Code (2005) was a
basis for granting judgment on the pleadings when Bright sought to reform a deed,
Bright never abandoned the property, and Davis failed to cite the statute in her
pleading or request the master to rely on the statute. We reverse.

We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings
based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the
finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286, 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App.
2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c),
SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as
admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384, 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App.
2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must consider that 'a
complaint is sufficient if it states any cause of action or it appears that the plaintiff
is entitled to any relief whatsoever.'" (quoting Falk, 341 S.C. at 287, 533 S.E.2d at
353)); Falk, 341 S.C. at 287, 533 S.E.2d at 353 (stating appellate courts have "held
that pleadings in a case should be construed liberally so that substantial justice is
done between the parties" (quoting Russell v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 86, 89,
406 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991))); id. ("[A] judgment on the pleadings is considered to
be a drastic procedure by our courts." (quoting Russell, 305 S.C. at 89, 406 S.E.2d
at 339)); Emery v. Smith, 361 S.C. 207, 215, 603 S.E.2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 2004)

1
We are mindful that the master's consideration of affidavits when determining
whether to grant Bright's motion for reconsideration could have converted the
motion into one for summary judgment. However, even if we considered the
master's ruling as a grant of summary judgment, it would not affect our resolution
of this appeal.
("Laches is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under
circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have
been done." (quoting Mid-State Trust, II v. Wright, 323 S.C. 303, 307, 474 S.E.2d
421, 423 (1996))); id. ("The party seeking to establish laches must show (1) delay,
(2) unreasonable delay, and (3) prejudice."); id. at 216, 603 S.E.2d at 602 ("[T]he
determination of whether laches has been established is largely within the
discretion of the trial court.").

We also hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the
pleadings based on section 15-3-340 because Bright had possession of the property
at issue within ten years of the commencement of the action. See Falk, 341 S.C. at
286, 533 S.E.2d at 353 ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual
allegations as admitted"); Pope, 427 S.C. at 384, 831 S.E.2d at 445-46 ("In
evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must consider that 'a complaint is
sufficient if it states any cause of action or it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to
any relief whatsoever.'" (quoting Falk, 341 S.C. at 287, 533 S.E.2d at 353)); Falk,
341 S.C. at 287, 533 S.E.2d at 353 (stating appellate courts have "held that
pleadings in a case should be construed liberally so that substantial justice is done
between the parties" (quoting Russell, 305 S.C. at 89, 406 S.E.2d at 339));
§ 15-3-340 ("No action for the recovery of real property or for the recovery of the
possession of real property may be maintained unless it appears that the plaintiff
. . . was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the
commencement of the action.").

Finally, as to Appellant's argument that the master improperly overruled the circuit
court when ruling on Davis's motion, we hold this argument is not preserved for
review because Bright did not raise it to the master. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke,
330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon
by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

REVERSED. 2

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.