State v. Eric Charles Peterson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Eric Charles Peterson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002097

Appeal From Greenville County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-006
Submitted December 1, 2022 – Filed January 4, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Eric Charles Peterson appeals his convictions and concurrent
sentences of fifteen years' imprisonment for four counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. On appeal, Peterson argues the trial court erred
in admitting prior bad act testimony, admitting entries from his journal, and refusing
to grant a mistrial. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The trial judge has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence
and his decision should not be disturbed absent prejudicial abuse of discretion."
State v. Clasby, 385 S.C. 148, 154, 682 S.E.2d 892, 895 (2009).

"The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court" and "will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting
to an error of law." State v. Wilson, 389 S.C. 579, 585, 698 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting State v. Harris, 382 S.C. 107, 117, 674 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ct.
App. 2009)). We give trial judges wide discretion "because a trial judge experiences
'a feel of the case' which oftentimes may not be detected from a cold printed record."
State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 494, 299 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1983).

I. STEPDAUGHTER'S TESTIMONY

All of the charges in this case concern Peterson's alleged abuse of his former
stepdaughter. Peterson first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the stepdaughter's testimony that she and Peterson used to play naked. He
argues this was inadmissible testimony about a prior bad act and was not relevant to
the charges for which he was indicted.

Rule 404(b), SCRE, provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
to show motive, identity, the existence of a common
scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or
intent.

"Rule 404(b) prevents the State from introducing evidence of a defendant's other
crimes for the purpose of proving his propensity to commit the crime for which he
is currently on trial." State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 30, 842 S.E.2d 654, 657 (2020).

When evidence of other crimes is admitted based solely on
the similarity of a previous crime, the evidence serves only
the purpose prohibited by Rule 404(b), and allows the jury
to convict the defendant on the improper inference of
propensity that because he did it before, he must have done
it again.

Id. at 41, 842 S.E.2d at 663.

In Perry, our supreme court held evidence that the defendant sexually assaulted his
stepdaughter more than twenty years prior to his trial for sexual offenses against his
biological daughters was inadmissible to show a common scheme or plan because
the evidence demonstrated nothing beyond the defendant's propensity to commit the
subsequent crimes. Id. at 44, 842 S.E.2d at 665. Our supreme court found the State
failed to meet the burden necessary to admit the prior bad acts under the logical
connection test because the State "did not identify any fact in the crimes charged that
was made more or less likely to be true" by the stepdaughter's testimony. Id. at 40,
44, 842 S.E.2d at 663, 665. The court reiterated, "The State must demonstrate to the
trial court that there is in fact a scheme or plan common to both crimes, and that
evidence of the other crime serves some purpose other than using the defendant's
character to show his propensity to commit the crime charged." Id. at 44, 842 S.E.2d
at 665. "The State must show a logical connection between the other crime and the
crime charged such that the evidence of other crimes 'reasonably tends to prove a
material fact in issue.'" Id. (quoting State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 417, 118 S.E. 803,
807 (1923)). "Whether the State has met its burden 'should be subjected by the courts
to rigid scrutiny,' considering the individual facts of and circumstances of each case."
Id. (quoting Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807).

The testimony at issue here is meaningfully different from the erroneously admitted
testimony in Perry. Here, the stepdaughter's testimony involved prior inappropriate
conduct towards her; not evidence (as in Perry) of prior inappropriate conduct
towards a different victim. We hold that this testimony was probative as to a pattern
of grooming and was evidence of Peterson's motive and intent. See Rule 404(b),
SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme
or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."); Perry, 430 S.C. at 72, 842
S.E.2d at 679-80 (Kittredge, J., dissenting) ("[T]he hallmark of the common scheme
or plan exception is that the charged and uncharged crimes are connected in the mind
of the actor by some common purpose or motive. . . . Thus, as with the modus
operandi exception where identity is interwoven with common scheme or plan,
motive can also be inextricably intertwined with a common scheme or plan."); State
v. Dinkins, 435 S.C. 541, 555, 868 S.E.2d 181, 188 (Ct. App. 2021) (holding the
defendant's repeated inappropriate conduct towards the victim was probative as to a
pattern of grooming and was evidence of intent and motive, countering his argument
that his actions toward the victim were innocent and properly familial).

The charged and uncharged acts here are logically connected within the pattern of
grooming, which included an escalation of the conduct towards Victim. See, e.g.,
Clasby, 385 S.C. at 157, 682 S.E.2d at 897 ("[E]vidence that defendant began
touching and committing other sexual misconduct with victim when she was six or
seven years old was admissible to show common scheme or plan during trial for the
indicted offense of CSC with a minor, second degree[,] on the ground that the 'six to
seven year pattern of escalating abuse of Victim by [defendant was] the essence of
grooming and continuous illicit activity.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Kirton, 381 S.C. 7, 36, 671 S.E.2d 107, 121-22 (Ct. App. 2008))). Though
this testimony admittedly does not show a lengthy pattern of various escalated
grooming, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in viewing the
testimony as grooming behavior and finding it admissible on that basis.

We also note the State is required to prove intent as an element of third-degree CSC
with a minor. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C) (2015) ("A person is guilty of
[CSC] with a minor in the third degree if the actor is over fourteen years of age and
the actor wilfully and lewdly commits or attempts to commit a lewd or lascivious
act upon or with the body, or its parts, of a child under sixteen years of age, with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
the actor or the child."). Peterson's prior inappropriate conduct with his stepdaughter
was arguably probative of his intent toward and grooming of the stepdaughter.
Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
testimony under Rule 404(b), SCRE.

II. JOURNAL ENTRIES

Peterson argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his journal entries.
He claims the journal entries did not contain any inculpatory statements about the
charged offenses. One of the entries references fear of going to jail. He asserts he
should not have to argue to the jury that he was afraid of going to jail for some other
offense because doing so would necessarily invite the jury to speculate that he had
committed other potentially illegal acts, painting him in a bad light.

Here again, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The critical
journal entry is the last one, which alludes to some action by Peterson that made him
fearful of going to jail. We agree with the State that the jury could view this journal
entry, and the other entries with the light shed on them by this last entry, as evidence
of consciousness of guilt. See State v. McDowell, 266 S.C. 508, 515, 224 S.E.2d
889, 892 (1976) ("As a general rule, any guilty act, conduct, or statements on the
part of the accused are admissible as some evidence of consciousness of guilt.").

III. MISTRIAL

Peterson argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial
when a witness stated that the police department placed the stepdaughter's written
allegation of abuse in a different victim's case file. Peterson argues this suggested
there was another case against Peterson with a different victim.

As with the other issues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court gave
a curative instruction, and the witness clarified that the letter was placed in "the
wrong case file totally unrelated to [this] case." See State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643,
658, 623 S.E.2d 122, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Generally, a curative instruction is
deemed to have cured any alleged error."); see also State v. Harris, 382 S.C. 107,
117, 674 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding "[t]he power of the trial court to
declare a mistrial should be used with the greatest caution under urgent
circumstances" and "[t]he granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure
that should only be taken if an incident is so grievous that the prejudicial effect can
be removed in no other way"). Indeed, multiple witnesses made multiple references
throughout the trial about the written allegation—a letter—being placed in the wrong
file, all without any objection save this one awkwardly worded reference, which the
court immediately remedied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Peterson's convictions and sentences are

AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.