SC Farm Bureau v. Richard Longphre

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company, Respondent,

v.

Richard K. Longphre and Travis E. Simpson,
Defendants,

Of Whom Richard K. Longphre is Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001141

Appeal From Lexington County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge,

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-443
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed December 7, 2022

AFFIRMED

Neal Douglas Truslow, of Truslow & Truslow, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Ross Buchanan Plyler, of Roe Cassidy Coates & Price,
PA, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Richard K. Longphre appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company (Farm Bureau). On appeal, Longphre argues the circuit court erred in
finding Farm Bureau did not provide liability coverage for the injuries he sustained
due to the alleged actions of Farm Bureau's insured, Travis Simpson. We affirm.
We hold the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment because
Simpson's actions fell within the policy's intentional acts exclusion. See State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Windham, 432 S.C. 134, 143, 850 S.E.2d 633, 638 (Ct.
App. 2020) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court
applies the same standard that governs the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP;
summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. ("In
determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party."); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dawsey, 371 S.C. 353,
356, 638 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Insurance policies are subject to the
general rules of contract construction."); id. ("The court must give policy language
its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning."); id. ("Although exclusions in a policy
are construed against the insurer, insurers have the right to limit their liability and
to impose conditions on their obligations provided they are not in contravention of
public policy or a statutory prohibition."); id. at 356, 638 S.E.2d at 105 ("The court
cannot torture the meaning of policy language to extend coverage not intended by
the parties."). Simpson's Farm Bureau policy excluded from personal liability
coverage bodily injury "resulting from intentional acts or directions of [the
policyholder] or any insured" and further provided "[t]he expected or unexpected
results o[f] these acts or directions are not covered." Longphre asserted Farm
Bureau was required to provide coverage for an injury he allegedly sustained
following an altercation with Simpson. Simpson testified that he tackled Longphre
to the ground, and as the men stood up, Simpson pushed Longphre, causing him to
fall. Simpson explained the push was "to get up and to get [Longphre] away from
[him] where [he] could get out of there." He acknowledged he could have risen
without pushing Longphre. Longphre's vague testimony that he and Simpson
became "entangled somehow," causing him to fall does not contradict Simpson's
testimony, which showed he intentionally pushed Longphre. In addition,
Longphre's complaint in the underlying action couching the incident in terms of
negligence did not create a genuine issue of material fact. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Barrett, 340 S.C. 1, 11, 530 S.E.2d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2000)
("Although South Carolina allows alternative pleading, a party may not invoke
coverage by couching intentional acts in negligence terms."). Although the record
contains evidence Simpson did not intend to injure Longphre, he intended to push
him. The plain language of the Policy excluded coverage for the unexpected result
of an intentional act.

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.