James Allen Johnson v. State of SC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James Allen Johnson, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000600

Appeal From Greenville County
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-075
Heard January 25, 2022 – Filed February 16, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Taylor Zane Smith, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: James Johnson argues the post-conviction relief (PCR) court
erred in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective when she did not object to the
admission of Johnson's statement to law enforcement because Johnson asserts his
statement was the result of a two-phase interrogation in violation of Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Johnson also argues he was prejudiced because the outcome of his trial would have
been different if his counsel had objected. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities: Chappell v. State, 429 S.C. 68, 74, 837
S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2019) ("When reviewing a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the 'court proceeds from the rebuttable presumption that
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" (quoting Smith v. State, 386 S.C.
562, 567, 689 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2010) (internal quotations omitted))); Speaks v.
State, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008) ("In [PCR] proceedings, the
burden of proof is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his application.");
Thompson v. State, 423 S.C. 235, 239, 814 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2018) ("To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR applicant must prove (1) counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the
applicant sustained prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance.");
Stokes v. State, 308 S.C. 546, 548, 419 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1992) (stating if "counsel
articulates a valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not be
deemed ineffective assistance of counsel"); State v. Williams, 405 S.C. 263, 273,
747 S.E.2d 194, 199 (Ct. App. 2013) ("To determine whether a suspect was in
custody for the purposes of Miranda, the Supreme Court has asked whether there
is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest."); State v. Kennedy, 325 S.C. 295, 303, 479 S.E.2d 838, 842
(Ct. App. 1996) ("The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are not
required if a suspect is simply taken into custody, but only if a suspect in custody is
subjected to interrogation. Interrogation is either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. It includes words or actions on the part of police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."); Williams, 405 S.C. at 275,
747 S.E.2d at 200 ("Simply because an interview takes place at a law enforcement
center and at the initiation of police investigators does not render it a 'custodial
interrogation.'" (quoting State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 708, 258 S.E.2d 896, 899
(1979))); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) ("Miranda warnings
are not required 'simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.'" (quoting Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977))); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191,
199, 607 S.E.2d 707, 711 (2005) (finding it unnecessary to address remaining
issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.

THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ. and HUFF, A.J., concur.