SCDSS v. Leeanne Cattles

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Leeanne Cattles, Domingo Perez, Ignatio Anaya, and
Guillermo Castellanos, Defendants,

Of whom Leeanne Cattles is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001428

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Anne Gue Jones, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-435
Submitted November 10, 2021 – Filed December 3, 2021

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
Union, for Appellant.

Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Jerrod Austin Anderson, of Anderson Law Office, P.A.,
of Orangeburg, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Leeanne Cattles (Mother) appeals an order of the family court
concerning eight of her nine children. On appeal, Mother argues the family court
erred by (1) finding educational neglect; (2) approving a permanency plan of
"another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA)" for C.A., termination of
parental rights (TPR) and adoption for W and C.P., non-relative placement for S.A.
and A, and relative placement for S.P., K, and D; and (3) allowing the Department
of Social Services (DSS) to forgo reasonable efforts to reunite the children with
Mother. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

1. We find a preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's finding of
educational neglect. See Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651
(2011) ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to
find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence."
(quoting Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 479, 682 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2009))). At the
merits hearing, the family court took judicial notice of the May 9, 2019 contempt
order in which the family court found Mother willfully violated the previously
issued compulsory school attendance orders for her children. Additionally, Mother
conceded her focus on ensuring her older children attended school caused her to
neglect her responsibility to ensure her younger children—who were eleven, eight,
and six years old at the time of the contempt hearing—also attended school.
Because this evidence shows that Mother "voluntarily and intentionally" failed to
comply with the compulsory school attendance orders, we find a preponderance of
the evidence indicates Mother "refus[ed] to cooperate" with the school's efforts to
bring about the children's attendance. See State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 571,
611 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2005). (stating that a finding of contempt results
from an act done "voluntarily and intentionally"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-20(6)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2020) ("[A] child's absences from school may not be
considered abuse or neglect unless the school has made efforts to bring about the
child's attendance, and those efforts were unsuccessful because of the parents'
refusal to cooperate."). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's finding that
Mother engaged in educational neglect.

2. We find the family court erred by approving a permanency plan of APPLA for
C.A. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family
court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view
of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Eason, 384 S.C. at 479, 682
S.E.2d at 807)). The family court's final order indicates it failed to identify a
compelling reason for approval of the plan or why reunification, relative
placement, and TPR and adoption were not in C.A.'s best interest. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-1700(C)(2) (Supp. 2020) ("If the court approves a plan of another
planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA), the court must find compelling
reasons for approval of the plan, including compelling reasons why reunification
with the parents, custody, or guardianship with a fit and willing relative, or
termination of parental rights and adoption is not in the best interest . . . .").
Additionally, the transcript of the merits hearing shows the family court failed to
ask C.A. about her wishes as to her placement plan. See id. ("At each hearing in
which the court approves or renews APPLA for a child over the age of sixteen, the
court must ask the child about the child's wishes as to the placement plan."). Thus,
we reverse the family court's approval of a permanent plan of APPLA for C.A.

Additionally, we find Mother failed to show the family court erred by approving
permanency plans of non-relative placement for S.A. and A, TPR and adoption for
W and C.P., and relative placement for S.P., K, and D. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384,
709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has
jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
evidence." (quoting Eason, 384 S.C. at 479, 682 S.E.2d at 807)); Ex parte Morris,
367 S.C. 56, 62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006) ("[T]he appellate court's broad scope
of review does not relieve the appellant of the burden of showing that the family
court committed error.").

3. Because the family court erred by approving a permanency plan of APPLA for
C.A., we find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the family
court's grant of DSS's request to forgo reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and
C.A. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family
court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view
of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Eason, 384 S.C. at 479, 682
S.E.2d at 807)); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640(C)(8) (Supp. 2020) ("The family
court may authorize [DSS] to . . . [forgo] reasonable efforts . . . when . . .
implementation of reasonable efforts . . . is inconsistent with the permanent plan
for the child."). Thus, we reverse the family court's authorization of DSS's request
to forgo reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and C.A.

As to Mother's seven other children, we find that the family court did not err by
granting DSS's request to forgo reasonable efforts. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709
S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has
jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
evidence." (quoting Eason, 384 S.C. at 479, 682 S.E.2d at 807)). Rather, we find a
preponderance of the evidence showed that implementation of reasonable efforts
would be inconsistent with the properly approved permanency plans of
non-relative placement, relative placement, and TPR and adoption because each of
the plans involve a grant of permanent custody to a third party.
See § 63-7-1640(C)(8) ("The family court may authorize [DSS] to . . . [forgo]
reasonable efforts . . . when . . . implementation of reasonable efforts . . . is
inconsistent with the permanent plan for the child."). Moreover, we hold that a
preponderance of the evidence—including the prior finding of willful contempt
against Mother, Mother's testimony conceding she was unable to ensure the
children attended school, and the fact that five of the seven children will reside in
Texas pursuant to their permanency plans—showed that forgoing reasonable
efforts for reunification was in the best interests of the children. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-1640(F) (Supp. 2020) ("If the court authorizes [DSS] to . . . [forgo]
reasonable efforts to . . . reunify a family, the court must make specific written
findings in support of its conclusion that . . . [implementation] of reasonable efforts
is not in the best interest of the child.").

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.