State v. Montrell Graham

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Montrell Graham, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000250

Appeal From Chester County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-411
Submitted November 1, 2021 – Filed November 17, 2021

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Montrell Graham appeals his conviction for accessory after the
fact to the commission of a felony and sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment,
suspended upon the service of five years' imprisonment and five years' probation.1
On appeal, Graham argues the trial court erred by failing to (1) grant his motion for
a directed verdict and (2) allow him to impeach the victim with a prior conviction.
We affirm.

1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Daverican
Gregory's testimony and Graham's statement to police reasonably tended to prove
Graham's guilt. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Graham's motion for a
directed verdict. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648
(2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state."); id.
at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the
[c]ourt must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Collins,
329 S.C. 23, 25-26, 495 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1998) ("[T]he elements of accessory
after the fact of a crime [are]: (1) the felony has been completed; (2) the accused
must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony; and (3) the accused
must harbor or assist the principal felon.").

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding evidence of Kochese
Gregory's conviction for involuntary manslaughter was not admissible for
impeachment purposes because the conviction was a remote conviction and its
probative value did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. See State v.
Robinson, 426 S.C. 579, 591, 828 S.E.2d 203, 209 (2019) ("The admission of
evidence concerning past convictions for impeachment purposes remains within
the trial [court's] discretion, provided the [trial court] conducts the analysis
mandated by the evidence rules and case law." (quoting State v. Dunlap, 346 S.C.
312, 324, 550 S.E.2d 889, 896 (Ct. App. 2001))); id. ("An abuse of discretion
occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are
controlled by an error of law." (quoting State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429-30,
632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006))); Rule 609(b), SCRE (providing evidence of a
conviction is not admissible if more than ten years has elapsed since the witness
was released from confinement, unless the court determines "the probative value of
the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect"); Robinson, 426 S.C. at 595, 828 S.E.2d at 211
("Rule 609(b) establishes a presumption against the admissibility of a remote

1
Graham was tried with co-defendant Quinton Tywan McClinton, who was
convicted of attempted murder, first-degree assault and battery, and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime.
conviction and places the burden of establishing admissibility of the conviction
upon the proponent of the evidence."); State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 18, 732 S.E.2d
880, 885 (2012) ("It is intended that convictions over 10 years old will be admitted
very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances." (quoting Clay v. State, 725
S.E.2d 260, 273 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 2012))); State v. Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d
246, 248 (2000) (establishing the non-exclusive five-factor analysis to determine
whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect includes the following
factors: "1. The impeachment value of the prior crime[;] 2. The point in time of the
conviction and the witness's subsequent history[;] 3. The similarity between the
past crime and the charged crime[;] 4. The importance of the defendant's
testimony[; and] 5. The centrality of the credibility issue."); Black, 400 S.C. at 19,
732 S.E.2d at 885 (providing that when the witness being impeached is not the
defendant, "some of the[] factors must, as a practical matter, be adjusted"); id. at
21, 732 S.E.2d at 886 (finding the impeachment value of manslaughter offenses
did not weigh in favor of admissibility because "manslaughter offenses, while
crimes of violence, are not crimes of dishonesty or untruthfulness that directly
impact the witness's veracity").

AFFIRMED.2

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.