State v. Mathis

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dale Elroy Mathis, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001932

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-085
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Filed March 17, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellant Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Assistant
Attorney General W. Joseph May, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor W. Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Dale Elroy Mathis appeals his murder conviction and sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Mathis argues
the trial court erred by refusing to tailor its self-defense instruction to include
language that "a defendant has the right to use so much force as appeared to be
necessary for complete self-protection." He contends this use of force instruction
was crucial to the jury's understanding of the law of self-defense and, without this
element, the instruction was incomplete and prejudicial.

During its charge, the trial court stated, "If the defendant was actually in imminent
danger, it must be shown that the circumstances would have warranted a person of
ordinary firmness and courage to strike the fatal blow to prevent death or serious
bodily injury." The court also instructed the jury, "The final element of
self-defense is that the defendant had no other probable way to avoid the danger of
death or serious bodily injury than to act as the defendant did in this particular
case." Additionally, the court discussed potential physical factors stating, "The
relative sizes, ages, and weights of the defendant and the victim may be considered
in deciding the apparent or actual need for force in self-defense and the amount of
force needed." Finally, the court charged the jury, "The reputation of the victim as
a violent person may be considered in deciding whether there was a need for force,
whether the defendant had reason to believe there was a need for force and whether
deadly force was reasonably necessary." We find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Mathis's motion for a use of force jury instruction because
the court's existing jury charge sufficiently instructed the jury on degree of force.
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) ("An
appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's] decision regarding a jury charge
absent an abuse of discretion."); Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d
528, 539 (2000) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is
based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without
evidentiary support."); id. at 390, 529 S.E.2d at 539 ("It is error for the trial court
to refuse to give a requested instruction which states a sound principle of law when
that principle applies to the case at hand, and the principle is not otherwise
included in the charge."); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463
(Ct. App. 2003) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's
jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); State
v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1994) ("The substance of the
law is what must be instructed to the jury, not any particular verbiage."); State v.
Hicks, 305 S.C. 277, 280, 407 S.E.2d 907, 909 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Although charges
requested by a party may be a correct statement of law, a [trial court] does not err
by refusing to deliver the charges verbatim."); Mattison, 388 S.C. at 479, 697
S.E.2d at 583 ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury
charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); State v. Fuller,
297 S.C. 440, 443, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989) (holding trial courts should
consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case in order to fashion a
specifically tailored self-defense charge); State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 418, 535
S.E.2d 431, 435 (2000) ("A self-defense charge is erroneous where the trial court
fails to charge on elements of the defense which were applicable to the issues
raised by the defendant.").

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., HUFF and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.