Greenville Hospital v. SCDOR

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Greenville Hospital System, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Revenue, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001548

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-065
Heard February 11, 2020 – Filed March 11, 2020

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Frank William Cureton, of Columbia, and Arthur Frazier
McLean, III, of Greenville, both of Haynsworth Sinkler
Boyd, PA; and Charles M. Sprinkle, III, for Appellant.

Patrick Alan McCabe and Jason Phillip Luther, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this contested case action concerning an application for a sales
tax exemption, Appellant Greenville Hospital System (GHS) seeks review of the
Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order granting summary judgment to Respondent
South Carolina Department of Revenue (the Department). GHS argues the ALC
erred in concluding that (1) the sales tax exemption in section 12-36-2120(41) of the
South Carolina Code (2014) excludes items sold by all political subdivisions of the
State and all "charitable institutions in the nature of hospitals"; (2) a political
subdivision cannot qualify as a charitable organization as contemplated by section
12-37-220 of the South Carolina Code (2014 & Supp. 2019); and (3) the sales tax
exemption statute may not be liberally construed in favor of political subdivisions.
We affirm as modified.

1. As to whether the sales tax exemption in section 12-36-2120(41) excludes
items sold by all political subdivisions of the State and all charitable institutions in
the nature of hospitals, we agree with the interpretation of this provision set forth in
category II.B on page 4 of SC Revenue Procedure #03-6. See S.C. Energy Users
Comm. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388 S.C. 486, 491, 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010)
("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the
meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. Where the statute's language is plain,
unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning."
(citation omitted)); State v. Johnson, 396 S.C. 182, 188, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct.
App. 2011) ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and
ordinary meaning[] and will not resort to forced construction that would limit or
expand the statute."). Therefore, the ALC's order is modified to conform to this
interpretation.

2. As to whether section 12-36-2120(41) must be liberally construed in favor of
political subdivisions, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Energy Users Comm., 388 S.C. at 491, 697 S.E.2d at 590 ("Under
the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court to change the meaning of a
clear and unambiguous statute. Where the statute's language is plain, unambiguous,
and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not
needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." (citation omitted));
see also CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74–75, 716 S.E.2d
877, 881 (2011) ("In this case, interlaced with these standard canons of statutory
construction is our policy of strictly construing tax exemption statutes against the
taxpayer. 'This rule of strict construction simply means that constitutional and
statutory language will not be strained or liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor.
It does not mean that we will search for an interpretation in [the Department]'s favor
where the plain and unambiguous language leaves no room for construction.' It is
'[o]nly when the literal application of the statute produces an absurd result will we
consider a different meaning.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Se.-Kusan, Inc. v. S.C.
Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487, 489–90, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981))); Duckett ex rel.
Duckett v. Payne, 279 S.C. 94, 96, 302 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1983) ("[T]he appellant
carries the burden of convincing this [c]ourt that the trial court erred."); accord
Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 413 S.C. 561, 578, 776 S.E.2d 397, 406 (Ct. App. 2015).

3. As to whether a political subdivision may qualify as a charitable organization
as contemplated by section 12-37-220, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities: York Cty. Fair Ass'n v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 249 S.C.
337, 339–40, 154 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1967) (distinguishing between a public
corporation and a private corporation); Sandel v. State, 126 S.C. 1, 7, 119 S.E. 776,
778 (1922) (same); Duckett, 279 S.C. at 96, 302 S.E.2d at 343 ("[T]he appellant
carries the burden of convincing this [c]ourt that the trial court erred."); accord
Flexon, 413 S.C. at 578, 776 S.E.2d at 406.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.