Maddaloni v. Pidanick

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christopher K. Maddaloni, Respondent,

v.

Jacqueline Pidanick, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002049

Appeal From Beaufort County
Peter L. Fuge, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-336
Submitted September 1, 2019 – Filed October 9, 2019

AFFIRMED

Jacqueline Pidanick, of Bluffton, pro se.

Marshall L. Horton, of Horton & Goodman, LLC, of
Bluffton, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jacqueline Pidanick (Mother) appeals the family court's May 6,
2016 order finding her in willful contempt of court of the April 1, 2015 final order
regarding custody of the parties' minor child (Child). On appeal, Mother lists the
following arguments: "(1) Social Media, (2) Birthday Visitation, (3) Christopher
[K.] Maddaloni [(Father)] Wants Sister to Pick up, (4) Lawyer Fees, (5) Domestic
Violence, (6) Lack of 14th Amendment Right for [Mother]." We construe
Mother's arguments as her statement of issues.1 We affirm.2

1. As to Mother's first and second arguments, we find the family court did not err
by finding her in willful contempt of the parties' April 2015 custody order. See
Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[T]he proper
standard of review in family court matters is de novo . . . ."); Hawkins v. Mullins,
359 S.C. 497, 501, 597 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A party may be found in
contempt of court for the willful violation of a lawful court order."); Ward v.
Washington, 406 S.C. 249, 254, 750 S.E.2d 105, 108 (Ct. App. 2013) ("A willful
act is one . . . done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do
something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the
law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or
disregard the law." (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Lipscomb, 398 S.C.
463, 469, 730 S.E.2d 320, 323 (Ct. App. 2012))); Hawkins, 359 S.C. at 501, 597
S.E.2d at 899 ("In a proceeding for contempt for violation of a court order, the
moving party must show the existence of a court order and the facts establishing
the respondent's noncompliance with the order."). The April 2015 order provides
the party without custody of Child on Child's birthday is entitled to three hours of
visitation if it is not a school day. Father testified Child's birthday was on a
nonschool day and Mother denied him visitation; Mother agreed Father did not see
Child on Child's birthday. Thus, we find Mother was in violation of the April 2015
order. Additionally, the April 2015 order provides, "Both parties shall be mutually
restrained from defamation of person, character, or business interest. As
defamation has been an issue in this open case, both parties are admonished to
strictly abide by this restraining order." We find the posts from Mother's Facebook
violate the provision in the April 2015 order against defamation.3

1
Any other issues not relating to her listed arguments are not addressed because
they were not properly raised to this court. See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR
("Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of
the issues on appeal.").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
3
As to Mother's argument she was not in willful contempt of court for her social
media posts because of the protection of the First Amendment, we find this
argument was not preserved for appellate review because she raised it for the first
time on appeal. See Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 212, 634 S.E.2d 51, 54 (Ct. App.
2006) ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family]
court."). Further, to the extent Mother contends she was not in willful contempt of
2. As to Mother's third argument the family court erred by modifying Father's
visitation rights because Father did not show a change in circumstances sufficient
to warrant a change in visitation rights, we find the court did not modify the
amount of visitation time Father had with Child but clarified Father's use of
daycare. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 596, 813 S.E.2d at 487 ("[T]he proper standard of
review in family court matters is de novo . . . ."). Further, the court did not raise
this issue sua sponte, Father raised the issue in his rule to show cause and at the
contempt hearing.4

court for her social media posts because Father did not prove the elements of
defamation, the order does not specify the parties need to prove the elements of a
defamation cause of action to establish a violation of the April 2015 order.
Additionally, Mother's arguments that Father falsified a Facebook post or
committed fraud upon the court in connection with the alleged falsified Facebook
post was not preserved for appellate review. See id. ("To preserve an issue for
appellate review, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family] court."). Moreover, Mother's
argument related to her Fourteenth Amendment right was not preserved for
appellate review. See id. ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the [family] court."). To the extent Mother argues the family court lacked
jurisdiction, we find the family court had subject matter jurisdiction. See Watson
v. Watson, 319 S.C. 92, 93, 460 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1995) ("Subject matter
jurisdiction refers to the court's 'power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" (quoting Dove v. Gold Kist,
Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 238-39, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994))); Rule 14, SCRFC
(providing parties with the procedural vehicle to bring a party into family court for
contempt proceedings).
4
To the extent Mother argues the court erroneously modified the location at which
the parties exchange Child, this issue was not preserved for appellate review
because it was not raised to or ruled on by the family court. See Doe, 370 S.C. at
212, 634 S.E.2d at 54 ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon
by the trial court."). Additionally, Mother's argument that Father committed
perjury is not preserved for appellate review. See id. ("To preserve an issue for
appellate review, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.").
3. As to Mother's fourth argument the family court erred by awarding Father
$1,000 in attorney's fees because she did not engage in contemptuous conduct and
the court had erroneously modified the April 2015 order without a request from
either party, we find, based on the foregoing, the family court did not err because
we affirm the family court's finding of contempt. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 596, 813
S.E.2d at 487 ("[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is de novo
. . . .").5

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and HILL, JJ., concur.

5
Mother's fifth and sixth arguments not preserved for appellate review. See Doe,
370 S.C. at 212, 634 S.E.2d at 54 ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, the
issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and
ruled upon by the trial court.").