Eastman v. SCDLLR

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

David Eastman, d/b/a Grading and Landscaping Material
Company, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation, South Carolina Contractor's Licensing
Board, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001797

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-184
Submitted April 1, 2019 – Filed May 29, 2019

AFFIRMED

Melvin R. Hutson, of Melvin Hutson, PA, of Landrum,
for Appellant.

Timothy Kyle Tennis, of the South Carolina Department
of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: David Eastman appeals the Administrative Law Court's (the
ALC's) final order affirming the decision of the Contractor's Licensing Board (the
Board) affirming the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and
Regulation's (LLR's) citation and fine against Eastman for engaging in unlicensed
contracting work. On appeal, Eastman argues the ALC erred by failing to find (1)
an unlicensed contractor is not prohibited from performing small amounts of work
covered by the licensing requirement and (2) the Board's decision was inconsistent
with its deregulation of "heavy construction." We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to Eastman's argument that unlicensed contractors are not prohibited from
performing small amounts of work covered by the licensing requirement: S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2018) ("The court may not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact."); MRI at Belfair, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control,
379 S.C. 1, 6, 664 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2008) ("As to factual issues, judicial review of
administrative agency orders is limited to a determination whether the order is
supported by substantial evidence."); Murphy v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 396 S.C. 633, 639, 723 S.E.2d 191, 194-95 (2012) ("When finding
substantial evidence to support the ALC's decision, the [c]ourt need only determine
that, based on the record as a whole, reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion."); S.C. Code. Ann. § 40-11-30 (2011) ("No entity or individual may
practice as a contractor by performing or offering to perform contracting work for
which the total cost of construction is greater than five thousand dollars for general
contracting or greater than five thousand dollars for mechanical contracting
without a license issued in accordance with this chapter."); Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of
Exam'rs in Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987) ("The
construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be
accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent
compelling reasons."); S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388
S.C. 486, 491, 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not
the province of the court to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous
statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a
clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the
court has no right to impose another meaning.").2

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2
Eastman's arguments that (1) section 40-11-300(A) of the South Carolina Code
(2011) provides it is unlawful to divide work into portions and (2) the ALC erred
by granting the Board's interpretation deference because "there is nothing in the
2. As to Eastman's argument that the Board's decision was inconsistent with its
deregulation of "heavy construction": S.C. Code. Ann. § 40-11-360 (2011)
(providing exemptions to title forty, chapter eleven's licensing requirements); S.C.
Code Ann. § 49-11-130 (2008) (granting the Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC) authority to "provide for the certification and
inspection of certain dams in South Carolina . . . to reduce the risk of failure of the
dams, prevent injuries to persons and damage to property, and confer upon the
department the regulatory authority to accomplish the purposes"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 49-11-200 (2008) (requiring DHEC's approval of dam construction plans and
specifications prior to construction); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-10 (2011) (providing
the Board was created under the administration of LLR to "protect the health,
safety, and welfare of the public through the regulation of businesses and
individuals who identify, assess, and provide contract work to individuals or other
legal entities").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

statute that compels extending the licensing requirement in this situation" and the
Board "has been inconsistent in interpreting the . . . minimum $5,000 cost for
requiring a license" are not preserved for appellate review. See Brown v. S.C.
Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 519, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002)
("[I]ssues not raised to and ruled on by the AL[C] are not preserved for appellate
consideration.").