Sease v. Sease

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Larry Clinton Sease and Melissa Pierce Sease,
Appellants,

v.

Cody McGee and Tiffany Sease, Respondents.

In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001411

Appeal From Lexington County
Dale Moore Gable, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-126
Submitted March 27, 2019 – Filed March 29, 2019

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

Allison Bullard McNair, of Building Families LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Alyssa Haladay Richardson, of McDougall, Self,
Currence & McLeod, LLP, of Columbia; and Elizabeth
Dalzell, of Columbia, both for Respondent Cody McGee.

Tiffany Sease, of Aiken, pro se.
Almand James Barron, of Shea and Barron, of Columbia,
as the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Larry Sease and Melissa Pierce Sease (collectively,
Grandparents) appeal an order from the family court, arguing the family court
erred by (1) finding Cody McGee's (Father's) consent to the adoption was required
under section 63-9-310 of the South Carolina Code (2010) (the consent statute), (2)
holding termination of parental rights (TPR) was not in Child's best interest, and
(3) awarding attorney's fees and costs to Father. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414-15, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011);
see also Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Although
this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore
the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony. Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 651-52. The burden is upon the
appellant to convince this court the family court erred in its findings. Id. at 385,
709 S.E.2d at 652.

"'Consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process,' and therefore, '[i]n order
for the court to issue a valid adoption decree, it must appear that the parent has
consented or otherwise forfeited his or her parental rights.'" Brown v. Baby Girl
Harper, 410 S.C. 446, 451, 766 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2014) (alteration in Brown)
(quoting Gardner v. Baby Edward, 288 S.C. 332, 333, 342 S.E.2d 601, 602
(1986)). However, "if the child was placed with the prospective adoptive parents
more than six months after the child's birth," then the unmarried father's consent is
not required unless

the father has maintained substantial and continuous or
repeated contact with the child as demonstrated by:

(a) payment by the father toward the support of the
child of a fair and reasonable sum, based on the
father's financial ability; and either

(b) visits by the father to the child at least monthly
when the father is physically and financially able
to do so, and when the father is not prevented from
doing so by the person or agency having lawful
custody of the child; or

(c) regular communication by the father with the
child or with the person or agency having lawful
custody of the child, when the father is physically
and financially unable to visit the child, or when
the father is prevented from visiting the child by
the person or agency having lawful custody of the
child.

The subjective intent of the father, if unsupported by
evidence of the acts specified in subitems (a), (b), and (c)
. . . does not preclude a determination that the father
failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated
contact with the child. In making this determination, the
court may not require a showing of diligent efforts by
any person or agency having lawful custody of the child
to encourage the father to perform the acts.

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-310(A)(4)(a)-(c) (2010).

We find Father's consent was required for this adoption. Father "maintained
substantial and continuous or repeated contact with [Child]" by paying "a fair and
reasonable sum, based on [his] financial ability," towards the support of Child. See
§ 63-9-310(A)(4)(a). After Child was born in 2012, Tiffany Sease (Mother) and
Father lived together with Child in a rental house for approximately one month
before Mother moved into Grandparents' home with Child; Mother subsequently
moved out of Grandparents' home, leaving Child in their care. Father testified he
provided for Child by renovating the rental home and buying diapers, toys, a breast
pump, food for Mother, and a crib. Although Father failed to provide for Child for
a period of time thereafter, at the time of the final hearing, Father was current with
his court-ordered child support. Further, although Father did not visit Child "at
least monthly" or maintain "regular communication" with Child, the record
supports the family court's finding that Grandparents thwarted Father's relationship
with Child. See § 63-9-310(A)(4)(b)-(c). Despite Grandparents' willingness to
facilitate visits between Child and Father when prompted by Father's mother, the
visits were short, supervised by Grandparents, and attended by other individuals
not invited by Father. Some visits were attended by individuals with whom Father
had a poor relationship, and at other visits Father struggled to connect with Child
because other individuals diverted Child's attention. We acknowledge Father could
have made a greater effort to secure the visitation he desired with Child; however,
Grandparents' dictation of the terms of Father's contact with Child thwarted a
meaningful relationship between Father and Child such that his consent was
necessary for the adoption of Child. See § 63-9-310(A)(4)(b) (providing a father
need not show he had visited the child monthly "when the father [was] prevented
from visiting the child by the person or agency having lawful custody of the
child"). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's finding requiring Father's
consent for the adoption of Child.

Further, although on appeal Father conceded the grounds for TPR were met, we
find TPR was not in Child's best interest. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp.
2018) (providing the family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of
twelve statutory grounds is satisfied and TPR is in the best interest of the child).
The record supports the finding that Father "is a hard-working, fit[,] and moral
person" with no history of drug or alcohol addiction or criminal tendencies. Father
desires a relationship with Child, and Child would benefit from the opportunity to
know Father outside of the limited contact Father has been afforded thus far in
Child's life. Additionally, Child would benefit from a continued relationship with
Father's mother, with whom Child had regular visits; Child would also benefit from
getting to know Father's extended family. Accordingly, we affirm the family
court's finding TPR was not in Child's best interest.

However, we reverse the award of attorney's fees and costs. See E.D.M. v. T.A.M.,
307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) (stating the following factors
should be considered when determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded
"(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) [the] beneficial results
obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4)
[the] effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living"). Although
Father ultimately prevailed, he contributed to the circumstances that gave rise to
this case. Here, the record does not reflect that Father stepped up to parent Child
when Mother left Child with Grandparents. Additionally, after Mother and Child
moved into Grandparents' home when Child was one month old, Father did not
provide support until Grandparents sought child support through court action.
Once the family court ordered Father to pay child support, Father made payments
for a time but had ceased child support payments in the six months prior to
Grandparent's initiation of this case. Further, although Grandparents thwarted
Father's relationship with Child during this time—making Father's consent
necessary for the adoption of Child—Father was not wholly prevented from seeing
Child. Rather, although the visits Grandparents offered were restricted, Father
chose not to take advantage of that time. Moreover, both parties would have
difficulty meeting their own financial requirements. Although Grandparents had a
greater source of income, the majority of the financial cost of raising Child fell on
them, and in light of the foregoing, the effect of the award of Father's attorney's
fees on Grandparents'—and thus Child's—standard of living would be inequitable.
Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney's fees and costs to Father. See
Lewis, 392 S.C. at 386, 709 S.E.2d at 652 ("The family court is a court of equity.").

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.