Hay v. Brown-Barnwell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Nell Barnwell Hay and Edward Barnwell, Respondents,

v.

Chauncey N. Brown-Barnwell, Janice Barnwell, Bank of
New York, Trust Under Agreement Dated 12/1/01
(EQCC Trust 2001-2) and all Persons claiming any right,
title, estate interest in or lien upon the real estate
described, and any known heirs or persons being as a
class identified as John Doe, whose true names are
unknown, and any unborn infants or persons under
disability being a class designated as Richard Roe, whose
true names are unknown, Defendants,

Of whom Chauncey N. Brown-Barnwell and Janice
Barnwell are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001010

Appeal From Beaufort County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-072
Submitted January 1, 2018 – Filed February 7, 2018

AFFIRMED

Chauncey Brown-Barnwell, of Brown Barnwell, P.C., of
Savannah, Georgia, for Appellant Chauncey Brown-
Barnwell.

Janice Barnwell, of Beaufort, pro se.

Drake Hunter Kaiser, of Kaiser Reddick, LLC, of West
Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this action seeking to enforce the terms of a mediation,
Chauncey Brown-Barnwell and Janice Barnwell assert the circuit court erred in
enforcing the settlement agreement because (1) the agreement did not comply with
Rule 43(k), SCRCP, and (2) Chauncey and Janice did not agree to the terms. We
affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. With regard to the first argument: S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp.
of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ("[I]t is a litigant's duty to
bring to the court's attention any perceived error, and the failure to do so amounts
to a waiver of the alleged error."); Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497
S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to
be preserved for appellate review.").

2. With regard to the second argument: Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v. Doyle, 381 S.C.
234, 241, 672 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In South Carolina jurisprudence,
settlement agreements are viewed as contracts."); Patricia Grand Hotel, LLC v.
MacGuire Enter., Inc., 372 S.C. 634, 640, 643 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ct. App. 2007)
("[T]he circuit court's role in determining the actual terms of [a] settlement
agreement between the parties is similar to the court's role in interpreting the terms
of a contract."); Messer v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 628, 598 S.E.2d 310, 317 (Ct.
App. 2004) ("[W]here an agreement is clear and capable of legal construction, the
court[']s only function is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intent of the parties
as found within the agreement.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.