State v. Dwyer

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Matthew Cory Dwyer, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002290

Appeal From Sumter County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-449
Submitted October 1, 2017 – Filed December 6, 2017

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney General
Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General
Susannah Rawl Cole, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 213, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009) ("In
criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); id. ("A trial
court's decision regarding jury charges will not be reversed where the charges, as a
whole, properly charged the law to be applied."); State v. Light, 378 S.C. 641, 649,
664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (2008) ("A self-defense charge is not required unless it is
supported by the evidence."); id. at 650, 664 S.E.2d at 469 ("If there is any
evidence in the record from which it could reasonably be inferred that the
defendant acted in self-defense, the defendant is entitled to instructions on the
defense . . . ."); State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 554, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586 (2010) ("It
is an axiomatic principle of law that [self-]defense has not been established if any
one element is disproven."); State v. Williams, 400 S.C. 308, 314-15, 733 S.E.2d
605, 609 (Ct. App. 2012) (Observing a person is justified in using deadly force in
self-defense when (1) the defendant is without fault; (2) the defendant was in
actual imminent danger, or actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing
his life or sustaining serious bodily injury; (3) a reasonable prudent man would
have had the same belief under the circumstances; and (4) the defendant had no
other probable means of avoiding the danger).

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.