Hoff v. Westvaco

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Virgil A. Hoff, Employee, Respondent,

v.

Mead Westvaco, Self-Insured Employer, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001001

Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-405
Heard April 11, 2017 – Filed October 25, 2017

REVERSED

Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Trask & Howell, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant, for Appellant.

James K. Holmes and Malcolm M. Crosland, Jr., both of
The Steinberg Law Firm, LLP, of Charleston, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Mead Westvaco appeals an order of the circuit court
affirming the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The
Appellate Panel's decision and order was entered following a remand order from
the circuit court finding Respondent Virgil Hoff's claim was not barred by the
statute of limitations and Hoff was entitled to coverage under the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act). Appellant appeals arguing (1) Respondent's claim
was time barred under the Act; (2) Respondent's argument that Appellant was
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations was untimely and
without evidentiary or legal support; and (3) the circuit court made improper
factual findings in determining Respondent was entitled to coverage under the Act.
We reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

"The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the
standard for judicial review of decisions of the Workers' Compensation
Commission." Gibson v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 3, 338 S.C. 510, 516, 526
S.E.2d 725, 728 (Ct. App. 2000). "In an appeal from the Commission, this [c]ourt
may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an
error of law." Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 S.C. 613, 617, 571 S.E.2d 92, 95 (Ct.
App. 2002). "The appellate court's review is limited to deciding whether the
Commission's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by
some error of law." Id.

As to Appellant's argument that Respondent's claim was time barred under the Act,
we agree. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Supp. 2006)1 ("The right to
compensation under this title is barred unless a claim is filed with the commission
within two years after an accident."); Schulknight v. City of N. Charleston, 352
S.C. 175, 179, 574 S.E.2d 194, 196 (2003) (holding the date of the "accident" from
which the statute of limitations begins to run is the last date of exposure to events
causing repetitive trauma). Respondent's last date of exposure was in October
2000, but he did not file his Form 50 until October 2003. Because the applicable
statute of limitations was two years from the last date of exposure, his claim was
time barred and the circuit court committed an error of law by reversing the
Appellate Panel.

We disagree with the circuit court's reliance on Mauldin because it concerned a
single work place injury to an employee's knee, rather than repetitive trauma.
Mauldin v. Dyna Color/Jack Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 20, 416 S.E.2d 639, 640 (1992).

1
This was the version of section 42-15-40 in effect when Respondent filed his
Form 50. Because his alleged injuries occurred prior to July 1, 2007, the prior
version of the Act governs this action. See Pee Dee Reg'l Transp. v. S.C. Second
Injury Fund, 375 S.C. 60, 62, 650 S.E.2d 464, 465 (2007).
Because this case involves allegations of repetitive trauma, our supreme court's
rule in Schulknight, as noted above, controls. Furthermore, even if the discovery
rule was applicable in this case, Respondent's claim was untimely because he filed
his claim more than two years after he knew of the hearing loss. By his own
admission, Respondent believed he was experiencing hearing loss from at least the
1970s, and he repeatedly stated he notified Appellant of his injury in October 2000.
Thus, Respondent's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the circuit
court committed an error of law.

As to Appellant's argument that the circuit court's findings with regard to estoppel
were unsupported by the evidence, we agree. See Langdale v. Carpets, 395 S.C.
194, 205, 717 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To successfully assert the doctrine
of estoppel, a party must show a (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of
the party estopped, and (3) prejudicial change in position."). Despite Respondent's
claim that Appellant's nurses continuously misled him, Respondent admitted he
was aware of his hearing loss as early as the 1970s. He also admitted giving notice
to Appellant in October 2000. Thus, Respondent failed to show he lacked
knowledge of the facts in question. Respondent was aware of his hearing loss by
his own admissions even if Appellant's nurses did tell him his audiograms were
normal. Accordingly, Respondent was not ignorant of his injury; therefore,
estoppel was not warranted.

To the extent the evidence on whether Respondent had knowledge of his hearing
loss was conflicting, the Appellate Panel's findings are conclusive. See Hargrove
v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 290, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004)
("Where there are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the
Appellate Panel are conclusive."). The Appellate Panel found Respondent was
aware of his hearing loss, and the circuit court erred by substituting its own factual
findings for those of the Appellate Panel. As a result, the circuit court committed
an error of law by finding Appellant was estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense.

As to Appellant's final argument, our decisions on the issues above are dispositive,
and therefore, we need not address Appellant's final issue. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(stating the appellate court need not reach remaining issues when prior issues are
dispositive).
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the final decision and order of the circuit court
and remand the case to the Commission to adopt the Appellate Panel order dated
July 2, 2010.

REVERSED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.