Gambrell v. Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Wanda Gambrell, Respondent,

v.

Christopher A. Smith, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000988

Appeal from Anderson County
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-143
Submitted January 1, 2017 – Filed April 5, 2017

AFFIRMED

William Norman Epps, III, of Epps, Nelson, Epps &
Perkins, of Anderson, for Appellant.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson &
Delgado, LLC, of Columbia; and James Stephen Welch,
of McGowan Hood & Felder, LLC, of Anderson, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Christopher A. Smith appeals the trial court's order denying his
motion to alter or amend the court's order granting Wanda Gambrell relief in the
amount of $20,000 for breach of contract. On appeal, Smith argues the trial court
erred in finding the contract was not void from its inception or void ab initio;
alternatively, Smith argues if the contract was not void ab initio and illegal, the
trial court erred in finding Smith failed to prove breach of contract with fraudulent
intent. Finally, Smith argues the trial court erred in finding Smith failed to
demonstrate Gambrell negligently misrepresented material information. We
affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in finding the contract was not void ab initio:
Butler Contracting, Inc. v. Court St., LLC, 369 S.C. 121, 127, 631 S.E.2d 252, 255-
56 (2006) ("[T]he trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal
unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or unless it clearly appears the findings
were influenced or controlled by an error of law."); McCall v. IKON, 380 S.C. 649,
658, 670 S.E.2d 695, 700 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[Q]uestions concerning credibility and
the weight to be accorded evidence are exclusively for the trial court."); Rule 52(a),
SCRCP ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon . . . ."); In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 131, 568
S.E.2d 338, 342 (2002) ("The rule is directorial in nature so 'where a trial court
substantially complies with Rule 52(a) and adequately states the basis for the result
it reaches, the appellate court should not vacate the trial court's judgment for lack
of an explicit or specific factual finding.'" (emphasis removed) (quoting Noisette v.
Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 123 (1991))); White v. J.M. Brown
Amusement Co., 360 S.C. 366, 372, 601 S.E.2d 342, 345 (2004) (finding a contract
was void when the subject matter of the underlying contract became illegal);
Nelson v. Bryant, 265 S.C. 558, 561, 220 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1975) ("[I]f there is an
independent contract, not forbidden by law, on which the action is brought, the
independent contract is enforceable even though it be with respect to the proceeds
of an illegal transaction.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in finding Smith failed to prove breach of
contract with fraudulent intent: Harper v. Ethridge, 290 S.C. 112, 119, 348 S.E.2d
374, 378 (Ct. App. 1986) ("In order to state a claim for breach of contract
accompanied by a fraudulent act, the plaintiff must plead facts establishing three
elements: (1) a breach of contract; (2) fraudulent intent relating to the breaching of
the contract and not merely to its making; and (3) a fraudulent act accompanying
the breach."); McCullough v. Am. Workmen, 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640, 644

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
(1942) ("[I]n an action for fraudulent breach of contract, the plaintiff must show
that the fraudulent act complained of accompanied the breach.").

3. As to whether the trial court erred in finding Smith failed to demonstrate
Gambrell negligently misrepresented material information: Rule 52(a), SCRCP
("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon . . . ."); Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. at 131, 568 S.E.2d at 342 ("The rule is
directorial in nature so 'where a trial court substantially complies with Rule 52(a)
and adequately states the basis for the result it reaches, the appellate court should
not vacate the trial court's judgment for lack of an explicit or specific factual
finding.'" (emphasis removed) (quoting Noisette, 304 S.C. at 58, 403 S.E.2d at
123)); Harrington v. Mikell, 321 S.C. 518, 521-22, 469 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ct. App.
1996) ("If the damage alleged is a pecuniary loss, the plaintiff must allege and
prove . . . the defendant owed a duty of care to see that he communicated truthful
information to the plaintiff . . . ."); AMA Mgmt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 309 S.C. 213,
223, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ct. App. 1992) ("There is no liability for casual
statements, representations as to matters of law, or matters which [the] plaintiff
could ascertain on his own in the exercise of due diligence."); id. ("[I]f the
defendant has a pecuniary interest in making the statement and he possesses
expertise or special knowledge that would ordinarily make it reasonable for
another to rely on his judgment or ability to make careful enquiry, the law places
on him a duty of care with respect to representations made to [the] plaintiff.");
Harrington, 321 S.C. at 522, 469 S.E.2d at 629 ("Reliance can be justified only if
the relationship of the parties is such that the defendant occupies a superior
position to the plaintiff with respect to knowledge of the truth of the statement
made."); id. ("However, there can be no reasonable reliance on a misstatement if
the plaintiff knows the truth of the matter.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.