Wells Fargo v. Nummy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Wells Fargo, N.A. as successor by merger to Wachovia
Bank, National Association, Respondent,

v.

Don A. Nummy, II, Dee S. Nummy, and Don A.
Nummy, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001521

Appeal From Lexington County
Tanya A. Gee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-153
Submitted January 1, 2017 – Filed April 12, 2017

APPEAL DISMISSED

Richard R. Gleissner, of Gleissner Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Stanley H. McGuffin and John Gwilym Tamasitis, of
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of Columbia; and Sarah
Patrick Spruill, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Don A. Nummy, II, Dee S. Nummy, and Don A. Nummy
(collectively, Appellants) appeal the trial court's order denying their motion for
summary judgment and granting Wells Fargo N.A., as successor by merger to
Wachovia Bank, National Association's (Wells Fargo's) motion to strike
Appellants' demand for a jury trial. We dismiss1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants' motion for summary
judgment: Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 477-78, 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994)
("[T]he denial of summary judgment does not finally determine anything about the
merits of the case . . . . Therefore, an order denying a motion for summary
judgment is not appealable."); Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C.
161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2003) (holding an order denying a motion for
summary judgment is not appealable).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in granting Wells Fargo's motion to strike
Appellants' demand for a jury trial: C & S Real Estate Servs, Inc. v. Massengale,
290 S.C. 299, 300, 350 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1986) ("An order denying a party a jury
trial is not immediately appealable unless it deprives him of a mode of trial to
which he is entitled as a matter of right."); Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v.
Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 332, 755 S.E.2d 437, 443 (2014) ("A party may waive
the right to a jury trial by contract." (quoting Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351 S.C.
56, 63, 566 S.E.2d 863, 866 (Ct. App. 2002))); id. at 332-33, 755 S.E.2d at 443
("[T]he right to a trial by jury is a substantial right, and we 'strictly construe' such
waivers." (quoting Beach, 351 S.C. at 64, 566 S.E.2d at 866)); Regions Bank v.
Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 663, 582 S.E.2d 432, 440 (Ct. App. 2003) (''A person
who signs a contract or other written document cannot avoid the effect of the
document by claiming that he did not read it."); Wachovia Bank, 407 S.C. at 333
n.8, 755 S.E.2d at 443 n.8 (finding waivers to be conspicuous and unambiguous
when they were printed in all capital letters with a bold heading and located at the
end of the document directly above the signature line).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.