State v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Corey William Brown, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000094

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-504
Submitted November 1, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of
Spartanburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 251, 639 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2006) ("In
criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v.
Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion."); State v. Taylor, 401 S.C. 104, 108, 736 S.E.2d 663, 665
(2013) ("A trial court's Fourth Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if
supported by any evidence, and an appellate court may reverse only when there is
clear error."); U.S. Const. amend. IV (guaranteeing "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures"); State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 319, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007)
("Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures."); Robinson v.
State, 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014) (providing a warrantless
search may be proper under the stop and frisk exception to the warrant
requirement); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) ("[W]here a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."); id. at 27
(providing when determining whether a suspect is armed and dangerous, "the issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger"); Banda, 371 S.C. at 253,
639 S.E.2d at 40 ("This Court has recognized that because of the 'indisputable
nexus between drugs and guns,' where an officer has reasonable suspicion that
drugs are present in a vehicle lawfully stopped, there is an appropriate level of
suspicion of criminal activity and apprehension of danger to justify a frisk of both
the driver and the passenger in the absence of other factors alleviating the officer's
safety concerns." (quoting State v. Butler, 353 S.C. 383, 391, 577 S.E.2d 498, 502
(Ct. App. 2003))).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.