Trexler v. The Humane Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James W. Trexler, Appellant,

v.

The Humane Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, and Wayne Brennessel, individually and as
Executive Director of the Humane Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000663

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-520
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed December 21, 2016

AFFIRMED

William H. Johnson, of Law Office of William H.
Johnson, LLC, of Manning; Matthew David Hamrick, of
Kernodle Coleman, of Charleston; and Warren W. Wills,
III, of Law Office of W. Westbrook Wills III, of Folly
Beach, for Appellant.

William O. Sweeny, III and John Earle Tyler, both of
Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, PA, of Columbia; and
Roopal S. Ruparelia, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA,
of Columbia, all for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: James W. Trexler appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Humane Society for the Protection and Care of
Animals (the HSPCA) and the HSPCA's executive director, Wayne Brennessel
(collectively, Respondents) as to Trexler's claims for malicious prosecution and
defamation. We affirm.1

First, we find the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
of Respondents as to Trexler's malicious prosecution claim. See Pallares v. Seinar,
407 S.C. 359, 365-66, 756 S.E.2d 128, 131 (2014) ("An appellate court reviews the
granting of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the [circuit]
court pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP." (quoting Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341
S.C. 372, 379, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000))); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing a
circuit court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); Pallares, 407
S.C. at 365, 756 S.E.2d at 131 ("In determining whether any triable issues of fact
exist, the [circuit] court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment."); Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011)
("In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment in cases applying the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only
required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence."); Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368
S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006) ("[T]o maintain an action for malicious
prosecution, a plaintiff must establish . . . lack of probable cause . . . ." (quoting
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965)));
id. at 436, 629 S.E.2d at 649 ("In determining the existence of probable cause, the
facts must be 'regarded from the point of view of the party prosecuting; the
question is not what the actual facts were, but what he honestly believed them to
be.'" (quoting Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 S.C. 475, 478, 289
S.E.2d 414, 416 (1982))); id. ("[W]hether probable cause exists . . . may be decided
as a matter of law when the evidence yields but one conclusion."); Parrott, 246
S.C. at 322, 143 S.E.2d at 609 (noting probable cause is "the extent of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind acting on the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor that the person charged was guilty of
a crime for which he has been charged, and only those facts and circumstances
which were or should have been known to the prosecutor at the time he instituted
the prosecution should be considered"); id. (stating the plaintiff has the burden to
prove the absence of probable cause).

Second, we find the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of Respondents as to Trexler's defamation claims. See Rule 220(c), SCACR
(noting this court may affirm any ruling upon any ground appearing in the record);
Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 161, 750 S.E.2d 605, 607
(2013) ("To prove defamation, a plaintiff must show . . . 'a false and defamatory
statement was made . . . .'" (quoting Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, LLC, 368
S.C. 444, 465, 629 S.E.2d 653, 664 (2006))).

We find it unnecessary to address any remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (noting this court need not address remaining issues on appeal when
disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.